{"id":125,"date":"2025-01-16T15:58:08","date_gmt":"2025-01-16T15:58:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/cyberimpact1\/?page_id=125"},"modified":"2026-05-04T16:44:26","modified_gmt":"2026-05-04T16:44:26","slug":"cyse-406","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/celestemerazluna\/cyse-406\/","title":{"rendered":"CYSE 406"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

WA 1: First Amendment Freedoms and Protections, The Cyber World, and You<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

To: Professor Mann <\/p>\n\n\n\n

From: Celeste Meraz-Luna, Cyber Law 406, and 01302562<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Subject: First Amendment Questions and the Digital World <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Date: May 26, 2025<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. A major platform I use to access, gather, and share or communicate information, ideas, and opinion includes WHSV-TV, Facebook, and various websites on the internet. The platform I choose typically depends on the topic I want to learn more about. Generally, I don’t consider myself well-informed about current political issues, as I don’t actively seek out this information unless my friends bring it up in conversation. However, if a political topic does catch my interest and I want to learn more, I am selective about the sources I use. For example, I tend to avoid websites ending in .com, as thees can sometimes contain unverified or biased information. Instead, I prefer to use more credible sources, such as websites ending in .org, .gov, or edu, which are typically more reliable and fact-based. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. While the First Amendment protects free speech, the U.S. government still has a role on limiting content that incites violence, spreads dangerous misinformation, or promotes hate. Existing laws allow the government to act when speech crosses legal boundaries, such as in cases of incitement (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969). Rather than direct censorship, the government can encourage social media platforms to enforce moderation policies transparently (Klonick, 2018). It should also invest in digital literacy programs to help citizens identify and resist misinformation (Office of the Surgeon General, 2021). Additionally, agencies like the FBI must monitor foreign interference and online manipulation, as seen during the 2016 elections (Mueller, 2019). By focusing on education, law enforcement, and platform accountability, the government can reduce the spread of harmful digital content while upholding constitutional rights.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/395\/444\/ <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Klonick, K. (2018). The new governors: The people, rules, and processes governing online speech. Harvard Law Review, 131(6), 1598\u20131670. https:\/\/harvardlawreview.org\/2018\/04\/the-new-governors-the-people-rules-and-processes-governing-online-speech\/ <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mueller, R. S. (2019). Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. U.S. Department of Justice. https:\/\/www.justice.gov\/storage\/report.pdf <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Office of the Surgeon General. (2021). Confronting health misinformation: The U.S. Surgeon General\u2019s advisory on building a healthy information environment. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. https:\/\/www.hhs.gov\/surgeongeneral\/reports-and-publications\/health-misinformation\/index.html <\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Private sector companies, particularly social media platforms like Facebook and X, play a critical role in managing misleading and hate content. These platforms have the responsibility to enforce community standards that restrict hate speech and misinformation, especially when such content leads to real-world harm. For example, Facebook removed COVID-19 misinformation that contradicted public health guidelines to prevent the spread of dangerous false information (Facebook, 2021). Similarly, X has used content labeling and user bans to curb election-related false information (Dwoskin, 2020). While these companies are not bound by the First Amendment in the same way as governments, their actions significantly shape the digital public square. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dwoskin, E. (2020, October 9). Twitter and Facebook have new rules for the election. Will they be enough? The Washington Post. https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/technology\/2020\/10\/09\/twitter-facebook-election-rules\/ <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Facebook. (2021, February 8). Removing more false claims about COVID-19 and vaccines. Meta. https:\/\/about.fb.com\/news\/2021\/02\/removing-more-false-claims-about-covid-19-and-vaccines\/ <\/p>\n\n\n\n

4. The incident at San Francisco State University (SFSU, where students disrupted and allegedly assaulted speaker Riley Gaines, raises significant First Amendment concerns. While peaceful protest is protected speech, the deliberate disruption of Gaines’ event and the harassment she face, including being barricaded in a room for hours, constitute a “heckler’s veto,” which is not protected under the First Amendment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Universities are meant to be the institutions of free expressions, where diverse viewpoints can be shared and debated. Suppressing speech through intimidation undermines this principle. As PEN America noted, such actions “make a mockery of the principles of free speech that allow higher education to function.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While students have the right to express different opinions, it must not interfere upon others’ rights to speak. The SFSU administration’s response, which included the approval of the event’s handling, suggests a failure to uphold these principles. Ensuring that all voices can be heard, even those that are controversial, is essential to the mission of hight education. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE). (2023, April 7). Outrageous: SFSU students shout down Riley Gaines and accost her after event. https:\/\/www.thefire.org\/news\/outrageous-sfsu-students-shout-down-riley-gaines-and-accost-her-after-event <\/p>\n\n\n\n

PEN America. (2023, April 10). Disruption and harassment at Riley Gaines speaking event made a mockery of free speech. https:\/\/pen.org\/press-release\/disruption-and-harassment-at-riley-gaines-speaking-event-made-a-mockery-of-free-speech <\/p>\n\n\n\n

5. The internet and technological advances both strengthen and challenge public discourse and democracy. They improve access to information and enable society engagement. However, these platforms also spread misinformation, create echo chambers, and allow hate speech, which can restrict society and undermine informed decisions. The 2016 U.S. elections showed how false information can influence voters. While technology democratizes speech, literacy and platform accountability is essential to preventing healthy democratic processes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

WA 2: Should American Spies Steal Commercial Secrets?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

To: Professor Mann <\/p>\n\n\n\n

From: Celeste Meraz-Luna, Cyber Law 406, and 01302562<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Subject: Memo on Stewart Baker’s “Should American Spies Steal Commercial Secrets?”<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Date: Jun 20, 2025<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Summary of Article <\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

In “Should American Spies Steal Commercial Secrets” (2025), Stewart Baker argues that the United States should reconsider its long-standing ban on commercial espionage by intelligence agencies. He critiques the current restrictive policies under Executive Order 14086 and Presidential Policy Directive 28, which prohibit spying to benefit U.S. companies. Baker explains that while that U.S. refrains from this practice, adversaries like China continue to steal intellectual property (IP) from American firms, using it to boost their economies. The article proposes a policy shift in which U.S. intelligence agencies support domestic economic interests by collecting relevant commercial intelligence, provided strong oversight and transparency mechanisms are in place. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Most Compelling Points in Support of the Author’s Position<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

1. Global Asymmetry in Espionage Practices<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Baker highlights that nations like China and Russia actively engage in state-sponsored IP theft, particularly in tech and defense-related sectors. China’s commercial espionage success, such as replicating U.S. semiconductors, shows that unilateral American restraint in ineffective (Baker, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Failure of International Norms<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite of 2015 G-20 agreement discouraging commercial cyberespionage, China continues to ignore these norms, while the U.S. clings to them. This puts American companies at a strategic disadvantage in the global economy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Policy Hypocrisy<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The U.S. already uses intelligence to benefit economic interests indirectly, such as in trade negotiations or sanctions enforcement, though it claims to avoid direct corporate benefit. Baker calls this “semantic gymnastics” and argues for honesty and formalization of the practice. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

4. Economic Security as National Security<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Baker asserts that protecting the innovation base of the U.S. is a matter of national security. He suggests a more proactive intelligence role in economic security could deter adversaries and help regain global competitiveness. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Three or More Explanations of Links Within the Article Itself<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

1. Legal Evolution<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Baker explains how the Obama-era Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28) and Biden’s Executive Order 14086 formally barred intelligence agencies from engaging in commercial espionage. These documents attempted to maintain trust among allies and uphold norms of restraint, though adversaries exploited the gap (Baker, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Allied Practices <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Baker contrasts U.S. restraint with the behavior of allies like France and Israel, which openly use intelligence services to advance economic goals. The U.K., for instance, permits it under the Intelligence Services Act. These references highlight that even friendly nations don’t follow America’s lead on this issue. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. Operational Considerations<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Baker points out the logistical need for U.S. intelligence to collaborate with commercial sectors to identify viable targets and avoid wasting resources. He wants that without private-sector feedback, intelligence efforts risk becoming misaligned or ineffective. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Surprised Me in the Article<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

I was surprised by the extent of exceptions the U.S. already allows for using intelligence to support economic goals, even while officially condemning commercial espionage. It was also striking to learn how U.S. allies operate more pragmatically, reflecting that America’s moral high ground may by unsustainable. Baker’s acknowledgment of the risk of cronyism of intelligence directly benefits private firms shows a thoughtful balance often missing in policy writing. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whether I Agree with the Author’s Position, and Why or Why Not<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

I partly agree with Baker’s argument. The current policy is outdated and leaves the U.S. vulnerable in an increasingly competitive global landscape where adversaries like China treat IP theft as a strategic tool. That said, I would only support commercial espionage in narrowly defined circumstances, especially involving critical infrastructure, national defense industries, or pandemic technologies, where there’s clear public benefit. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to a RAND Corporation report, targeted economic intelligence gathering could be justified if managed under congressional oversight and made accessible to all U.S. firms through neutral public channels (Libicki et al., 2020). Additionally, Goldsmith (2021) has warned that unrestricted economic espionage could degrade democratic legitimacy, so strong ethical and legal guardrails are essential. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ultimately, a modest recalibration-not abandonment- of current policy seems warranted. The U.S, should prioritize transparency, fairness, and oversight it if chooses to use its intelligence tools for economic security. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

References <\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Baker, S. (2025, April 14). Should American spies steal commercial secrets? Lawfare. https:\/\/www.lawfaremedia.org\/article\/should-american-spies-steal-commercial-secrets<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Goldsmith, J. (2021, August 5). The failures of the G-20 espionage norm. Lawfare. https:\/\/www.lawfaremedia.org\/article\/failures-g-20-espionage-norm<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Libicki, M. C., Greenberg, M. D., Senty, D. B., & Chalk, P. (2020). Cyberdeterrence and cyberwar. RAND Corporation. https:\/\/www.rand.org\/pubs\/monographs\/MG1147.html<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2014). Presidential Policy Directive 28: Signals intelligence activities. https:\/\/www.dni.gov\/index.php\/newsroom\/reports-publications\/reports-publications-2014\/item\/1020-ppd-28<\/p>\n\n\n\n

White House. (2022). Executive Order 14086 on enhancing safeguards for United States signals intelligence activities. https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefing-room\/presidential-actions\/2022\/10\/07\/executive-order-on-enhancing-safeguards-for-united-states-signals-intelligence-activities\/<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

WA 1: First Amendment Freedoms and Protections, The Cyber World, and You To: Professor Mann  From: Celeste Meraz-Luna, Cyber Law 406, and 01302562 Subject: First Amendment Questions and the Digital World  Date: May 26, 2025 1. A major platform I use to access, gather, and share or communicate information, ideas, and opinion includes WHSV-TV, Facebook,… <\/p>\n

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