Strengthening Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (BLUF)
Increasingly, cyber threats may gravely harm our critical infrastructure, including
power grids, water supply, and transportation systems. Therefore, I argue for the urgent need for
the adoption of responsible policies for critical infrastructure development to have stronger
cybersecurity standards justifiably imposed across the public and private sectors, enshrined in
well-constituted regulatory frameworks. The issues are complicated, and no simple solution
exists, but it is of utmost importance that an ethical approach be applied to securing critical
infrastructure before catastrophic events happen. Furthermore, in the following section, we
examine the responsible cyber-infrastructure development perspective.
The Responsible Cyber-Infrastructure Development Perspective
The responsible cyber-infrastructure development principle is that ethical, societal,
and political implications must, therefore, be taken into account in the creation and maintenance
of systems. This principle applied to critical infrastructure means that resilience and security
must come first for governments and private enterprises, and not short-term cost savings and
convenience. We need to accept the fact that cyberattacks against critical resources are real and
have already occurred, such as the Colonial Pipeline in 2021 (Colonial Pipeline, 2021).
At a minimum, governments will require cybersecurity standards for critical
infrastructure sectors as a health and safety code applies to specific physical infrastructure.
Businesses should not be able to treat cybersecurity considerations in establishing essential
services as optional or secondary. Allowing societal burden to rest solely on private business by a
laissez-faire approach creates unacceptable risks for society as a whole. In addition,
public-private initiatives need to be broadened to facilitate improved threat intelligence sharing,
facilitate collaborative incident response, and joint investment in defensive technologies.
Evidence Concerning Current Threat Landscapes
Stronger cyber policies are needed, as evidenced by several real-world incidents. Attacks
on hospitals, the food supply chain, and water systems proved the existence of vulnerabilities
beyond those aimed at the Colonial Pipeline. For example, the attempted poisoning of drinking
water by hackers (who raised the level of lye to unsafe amounts, using a Florida water treatment
plant in February 2021) was aimed at causing a major disruption (Perlroth, 2021) (3).
Fortunately, it was prevented from achieving its objective, but it did show just how woefully
unprotected some facilities are.
The United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the FBI,
and the Department of Justice have continually warned that foreign nation-states and criminal
organizations are poking around in critical infrastructure networks. The more new technologies
are added, such as IoT sensors and AI, to infrastructure systems, the more dramatically the attack
surface increases and the opportunities for exploitation multiply (CISA, n.d; DOJ, 2021). It is a
well-known concern that in the absence of mandatory cybersecurity protocols, critical sectors
may underspend on security due to the economic pressures of business as usual.
It is going to leave such decisions completely up to individual organizations, and that
poses problems concerning system-wide vulnerabilities. Such a network will have highly
interconnected nodes; therefore, the failure of just one node will percolate through the entire
system, resulting in disruption on an immense scale, economic collapse, or even death. But, do
we have any objections?
Counterarguments and Ethical Complexities
Now let’s look at mandating improvements in cybersecurity; however, it does require
confronting many challenges. One objection is otherwise valid, for it could impose significant
costs on small and medium-sized service providers and possibly drive many of them out of
business or into monopolies, while another would be that too much government engagement
might stifle innovation and produce bureaucratic inefficiencies that delay important
advancements.
Those concerns stand. Regulations must be flexible, and small providers may have
government subsidies or tax credits to defray compliance costs. Regulating principles outcomes,
like resilience and capabilities for threat detection, rather than prescriptive mandates dictating
exact technologies or methods-preferably adopts a principle-based approach to allow
organizations to innovate towards an all-inclusive approach.
No security system can be perfect. Even the best defenses cannot withstand a very
determined, resourceful, and highly skilled attacker. This reality begs for “defense in depth”-that
is, layered security measures so that the chances of failures in the event of successful breaches
remain relatively low.
The Short Arm: Long-Term Ramifications
Apparatuses would pay dire prices and would also end up worse than the immediate
threat. Attack through a saboteur into the control systems of either the power grid or financial
systems could lead to cascading societal failures – sending hospitals into darkness, food as scarce
as hen’s teeth, sending transport systems into confusion, and causing panic among societies. Risk
builds, decade after decade, if investments in cybersecurity improvement do not catch up with
emerging technological advancements (DOE, 2020).
It may be difficult to make critical systems survivable if the AI introduces
self-propagating malware and other such beneficial exploits into the networked computers of
one’s country. Current prediction models indicate that by 2040, most cyberattacks will be carried
out automatically, exploiting several vulnerabilities at once, and without any human oversight.
Continuous investment in resilience will be joined with the cultivation of a psychocultural
attitude towards cybersecurity across industries, creating leaders and a workforce well-versed in
a cybersecurity-aware environment. Which leads me to my next topic: the future of digital safety.
Conclusion: The Future of Digital Safety
It is my proposition in this paper that to secure the critical infrastructure system, careful
and assertive measures must be considered in cybersecurity policy development. Disturbing
real-life examples of attacks are indications that there should be minimum obligatory standards
of the working environment for cybersecurity, and these standards should correspond to the
threats imposed. Truly, such considerations regarding costs and impacts on innovation are
legitimate; however, no project ever designed will guarantee full security. On the contrary,
irresponsibility is poised to weigh heavily, should people decide to stand by as atrocities unfold
before them.
It is to bearing in mind that they need to work out regulations for a balance between
security and economic viability of its maintainability, and the predictability of an event in
technology shift at a time would seem monumental. But if one sees those complexities, it can
become the very strength of the case for immediate action. Cyber-resilient infrastructure must be
put into construction now to save the prospect of shared catastrophes tomorrow.
We cannot afford to rest on our laurels or rely on some last-minute stroke of luck. The
combination of responsible development of cyber-infrastructure and anticipation of unpredictable
ramifications of technological evolution may be the best bet on the future of critical social
functions in an increasingly connected world.

References
Colonial Pipeline. (2021, May 10). Colonial Pipeline system incident update. Retrieved from
https://www.colpipe.com/news-insights/media-resources/post/media-statement-update-co
lonial-pipeline-system-disruption/
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). (2023, February 9). CISA warns of
threats to critical infrastructure sectors. Retrieved from
https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience
U.S. Department of Justice. (2021, June 7). Department of Justice seizes $2.3 million in
cryptocurrency paid to the ransomware extortionists Darkside.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-seizes-23-million-cryptocurrency-paid-ransomware-extortionists-darkside
Perlroth, N. (2021, February 8). Florida city’s water supply hacked in cyberattack, officials say.
The New York Times. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/08/us/oldsmar-florida-water-supply-hack.html
U.S. Department of Energy. (2020, July). Multiyear plan for energy sector cybersecurity. Office
of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response. Retrieved from
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2020/07/f76/DOE-CESER-Multiyear-Plan-for
Energy-Sector-Cybersecurity_0.pdf