Policy Paper 4: Social Implications of Information Warfare in a Time of Peace
Maintaining information integrity/public support at home and abroad is an important aspect of Information Warfare (IW). Public support for national defense spending and military operations is critical to the success of those efforts. According to the AF Public Affairs office, “The relationship built between the military and the public in peacetime is vital to mission success in wartime or during contingencies since information coming from US and coalition forces will have a higher likelihood of being accepted as credible, truthful, and useful than would the adversary’s information. This truth-based relationship strengthens [Public Affairs] operational capabilities to counter adversary propaganda and disinformation.” (USAF, 2020)
Efforts to build those relationships creates transparency between the military and the public but may make some Americans feel manipulated to think or feel a certain way. It can also be countered by adversaries that use tactics and techniques to muddle public opinion. Yevgeny Prigozhin, who is linked to the Russian Kremlin, made public his knowledge of Russian interfering in US elections. White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre pointed out, unsurprisingly, that Russia promoted narratives to undermine democracy and seed consternation and confusion (Pavlova, 2022) . It is important to adapt to emerging threats and use peacetime to gain the best footing for potential wartime.
In a sense, IW works in conjunction with the defense forward and persistent engagement policy which was first published by the Department of Defense in 2018 and employed to attain surefootedness in the cyber environment to protect its assets and interests (Corn, 2022). U.S. Air Force Colonel Clayton Small of the 16th Air Force division chief of A37/8 Operations Support is quoted saying, “It’s a constant cat and mouse game and staying one step ahead of the adversary is paramount to ensure protection…” (Sherwood, 2022). To obtain and maintain information superiority it requires continuous practice and preparation. Setting up strategies for every known or conceivable cyber scenario takes time, resources, and planning; it must be set up during peacetime to minimize any negative impact. The Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) of the USAF collects, processes, and disseminates information in a perpetual and expanding mission (CRS, 2021). Having established roles and processes allows the AFISR to act quickly to support the cyber environment in any capacity.
References:
United States Air Force (USAF). (2020, September 10). Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-61. U.S. Air Force Doctrine. Retrieved November 13, 2022, from https://www.doctrine.af.mil/
Pavlova, U. (2022, November 8). Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin appears to admit to US election interference. CNN. Retrieved November 10, 2022, from https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/07/europe/yevgeny-prigozhin-russia-us-election-meddling-intl
Corn, G. P., & Goldman, E. (2022, March). ‘Defend Forward and Persistent Engagement’, in Jack Goldsmith (ed.) The United States’ Defend Forward Cyber Strategy: A Comprehensive Legal Assessment. Academic.oup.com. Retrieved November 13, 2022, from https://academic.oup.com/book/41393/chapter/352684202
Sherwood, D. (2022, October 6). Empowering airmen on Cybersecurity. Sixteenth Air Force (Air Forces Cyber). Retrieved November 10, 2022, from https://www.16af.af.mil/Newsroom/Article/3182511/empowering-airmen-on-cybersecurity/
Congressional Research Service (CRS). (2021, October 26). Defense primer: The United States Air Force – Federation of American … Congressional Research Service. Retrieved November 13, 2022, from https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF10547.pdf
Austin, L. (2022, October 27). Media.defense.gov. U.S. Department of Defense. Retrieved November 14, 2022, from https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF