Policy Paper 2: Defense Forward and Persistent Engagement
In late 2018 Sen. Ben Sasse (R-Neb.), one of many in the electoral branch, held a hearing with Gen. Nakasome, Commander of the U.S. Cyber Command (USCC). Sen. Sasse believed there was an oversight within the USCC and wanted clearly defined lines in the sand when it comes to how the US operates within cyberspace (Sasse, 2018). In 2019 Rep. Jim Langevin, D-R.I., had this to say:
“Unfortunately, the White House has still not provided access to documents related to its more aggressive cyber strategy…” and “That is simply unacceptable. Effective oversight requires having a rubric on which to gauge an administration’s actions, yet the White House continues to refuse to provide that rubric.” (Pomerleau, 2022)
And in 2020 the Cyberspace Solarium Commission (CSC) published its report of recommendations on a strategic approach to national defense in cyberspace. The report was a response to the USCC’s policy and vison which is based on documents from 2018 that include Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority and USCYBERCOM Cyberspace Strategy Symposium Proceedings. These documents echo the same ideology of defend forward and persistent engagement.
One such reason for persistent engagement and defense forward is to counter the theft of Intellectual Property (IP) from China which is disincentivizes innovation investments and estimated loss to be around 250-600 billion every year. China wants very much to lean into the momentum of becoming an economic world leader through any means necessary. As such the US wants very much to prevent it’s IP from being stolen (Fischerkeller, 2020).
USCC established this policy to seize initiative and disrupt adversary’s actions through continuous engagement and sustain overmatch of adversary capabilities and achieve superiority against adversaries by directing assets towards areas of harassment or adversarial attacks. Senator King (I-ME), co-chair of the CSC, held another hearing in 2021 to address the USCC policy post CSC report published in March of 2020. However, even after the CSC report was published, Gen. Nakasone maintained his focused on being active in stifling adversaries below the level of armed conflict versus trying to define the specifics of what will or won’t elicit a response. He was however not against the idea and believed in the policymakers were working on a doctrine (King, 2021).
This constant vigilance can create tension not only with the adversaries that become backed into a corner, but also with the allies with whom the US works with. The style with which the US implements its persistent engagement and forward defense can be seen as aggressive while the US more likely prefers assiduously active. It does create constant friction because of continuous uptime and tends to intersect a lot of entities. It’s not that said entities necessarily want to engage with the US, more that the US creates an environment to be engaged (Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt NUPI, 2019).
Prior to the USCC 2018 policy, they conducted a cyber operation against a terrorist group that was operating within an ally country without consent or notification. This sparked concerns and outrage that has had lasting effects and would eventually present a double standard of what if an ally were to hack into US owned servers (Smeets, 2020). Additionally, Jason Healy and Alexander Klimburg, critics of the USCC policy, have stated that the policy will lead to intensification and escalation between states (7).
References
Sasse, B (2018). Senate’s defense bill includes Sasse’s Cybersecurity Solarium Commission [Press release]. https://www.sasse.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/5/senate-s-defense-bill-includes-sasse-s-cybersecurity-solarium-commission
Pomerleau, M. (2022). Two years later, what does persistent engagement and defend forward mean? C4ISRNet. Retrieved October 2, 2022, from https://www.c4isrnet.com/dod/2019 /11/11/two-years-in-how-has-a-new-strategy-changed-cyber-operations/
Fischerkeller, bio), M. P. (2020). Opportunity Seldom Knocks Twice: Influencing China’s Trajectory via Defend Forward and Persistent Engagement in Cyberspace. Asia Policy, 15:4, 65-89. DOI: 10.1353/asp.2020.0060
King, A (2021). King Emphasizes a Forward-Thinking Cyberdoctrine, to Clearly Communicate “A Price To Be Paid” by Adversaries [Press release]. https://www.king.senate.gov/ newsroom/press-releases/king-emphasizes-a-forward-thinking-cyberdoctrine-to-clearly- communicate-a-price-to-be-paid-by-adversaries
Norsk utenrikspolitisk institutt NUPI (2019). The U.S. Cyber Strategy of Persistent Engagement [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZKXZJM137_I
Smeets, M (2020). U.S. cyber strategy of persistent engagement & defend forward: implications for the alliance and intelligence collection, Intelligence and National Security, 35:3, 444-453, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2020.1729316
Devanny, Joe (2022). ‘Madman Theory’ or ‘Persistent Engagement’? The Coherence of US Cyber Strategy under Trump, Journal of Applied Security Research, 17:3, 282-309, DOI: 10.1080/19361610.2021.1872359