{"id":447,"date":"2024-11-26T18:36:19","date_gmt":"2024-11-26T18:36:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/edwin-wells-4\/?page_id=447"},"modified":"2024-11-26T18:53:38","modified_gmt":"2024-11-26T18:53:38","slug":"2017-national-security-strategy-policy-analysis-political-impact","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/edwin-wells-4\/2017-national-security-strategy-policy-analysis-political-impact\/","title":{"rendered":"Political Impact"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

2017 National Security Strategy Policy Analysis: Political Impact<\/span><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Hamza Demirel<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

CYSE425W
Edwin Wells IV

<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

                The 2017 National Security Strategy, from the Trump administration, not only gave guidance and goals for domestic agencies to protect \u201cthe American people and preserving our way of life, promoting our prosperity, preserving peace through strength, and advancing American influence in the world\u201d (NSS, 2017, p. II). The document also influenced politicians\u2019 decision making regarding international relations. Specifically, with the \u201crespon[se] to the growing political, economic, and military competitions we face around the world\u201d (NSS, 2017, p. 2). With the belief that these \u201ccompetitions and rivalries facing the United States are not passing trends or momentary problems. They are intertwined, long-term challenges that demand our sustained national attention and commitment\u201d (NSS, 2017, p. 3).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                For politicians to make these types of decisions in accordance with the strategy a regional context is important. Thus, the strategy lists political, economic, and military and security priority actions for different regions. These regions include the Indo-Pacific, Europe, Middle East, South and Central Asia, Western Hemisphere, and Africa. In general, these actions will deepen collaboration with allies and partners, modernize economies, and increase security through strength in all these regions. Specifically, we shall look at how this document impacts the relationship between the United States and China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                Listed in the Indo-Pacific region, the document specifically calls out China\u2019s actions and agenda as \u201cendanger[ing] the free flow of trade, threaten[ing] the sovereignty of other nations, and undermin[ing] regional stability\u201d (NSS, 2017, p. 46). However, relations between China and the U.S. began to deteriorate around 2010 and the Trump administration only accelerated this deterioration (Foot & King, 2019, p. 40). Foot & King describe two key aspects that have driven U.S. perceptions and policies toward China. First, is the development of technology that has both high commercial and military value. Second, is that the U.S. has increasingly used legal and economic mechanisms as strategic maneuvers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                Trump\u2019s administrative response to the perceived threat of China\u2019s agenda and advances in new technology were different from Obama\u2019s administration in managing the withdrawn political relationship. Trump has applied an offshore balancing strategy in dealing with China whereas Obama utilized a balance power policy. \u201cOffshore Balancing Strategy: This strategy means buck passing and using other powers to face and control potential hegemony. \u2026 It describes a strategy in which a great power uses favored regional powers to check the rise of potentially-hostile powers\u201d (Saniabadi, 2018, p. 192). This strategy has been accentuated in the 2017 National Security Strategy document encouraging greater independence of U.S. allies and partners. \u201cIn applying the offshore balancing strategy, Trump believes that the neighboring states of China are too much dependent on the U.S. for their security against China\u2019s threats and need to be more independent\u201d (Saniabadi, 2018, p. 201).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                Economic pressures were also implemented at checking China\u2019s economic growth and gaining \u201csuperiority over China in this [economic] sphere\u201d (Saniabadi, 2018, p. 203.). With the mindset \u201cthat China\u2019s acquisition of U.S. technology has led to the closing of military and technological distance between the two countries, the implication being that those advances must be stopped\u201d (Foot & King, 2019, p. 47). Also, China\u2019s shifting global position from follower to leader intensifies the U.S. \u201canxiety regarding China\u2019s growing competitiveness and global ambition\u201d (Wang, 2019, p. 390.). Thus, furthering disputes between the U.S. and China with an increase and escalation of trade disputes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                 As trade disputes intensified and rounds of new tariffs were placed in July of 2018 a full blown trade war emerged \u201cwith more than US$300bn worth of goods announced by both countries went into effect in July and September, respectively\u201d (Wang, 2019, p. 378.). This clearly happened because of the shift in perspective from an economic partner to a competitor that could undermine the U.S. power. Trump also withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, renegotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement, and initiated investigations into unfair trading practices.  \u201cIt can be seen that Trump\u2019s fixation with cutting the trade deficits is at the heart of his administration\u2019s trade policy\u201d (Wang, 2019, p. 392.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

                As China being specifically called out in the 2017 National Security Strategy policy changes have been made which have seriously impacted political relations with a large economic power. In this case it has been perceived as not for the better and greater divided the U.S. and China in terms of relations. Challenging China\u2019s rapid advancement of technology and economic status with trade policy changes and policies to strengthen surrounding allies of the U.S. driven by U.S. anxiety and fear of eroding power. Thus, leading to increased trade disputes and eventually trade war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Foot, R., & King, A. (2019). Assessing the deterioration in China\u2013U.S. relations: U.S. governmental perspectives on the Economic-Security Nexus. China International Strategy Review<\/em>, 39\u201350. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/s42533-019-00005-y<\/p>\n\n\n\n

NSS booklayout fin 121917 – the white house<\/em>. Trump Whitehouse. (2017, December 18). https:\/\/trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/12\/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Saniabadi, E. R. (2018). Comparative Analysis of U.S. 2017 National Security Strategy Document towards China and Iran. Geopolitics Quarterly<\/em>, 14<\/em>(4), 188\u2013208.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Wang, Z. (2019). Understanding trump\u2019s trade policy with China: International pressures meet domestic politics. Pacific Focus<\/em>, 34<\/em>(3), 376\u2013407. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1111\/pafo.12148<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

2017 National Security Strategy Policy Analysis: Political Impact Hamza Demirel CYSE425WEdwin Wells IV                 The 2017 National Security Strategy, from the Trump administration, not only gave guidance and goals for domestic agencies to protect \u201cthe American people and preserving our way of life, promoting our prosperity, preserving peace through strength, and advancing American influence in… <\/p>\n

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