



Cyber Law
Group #4

Cyber Incident: ROT Polymorphic Worm

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


What Happened?

- A polymorphic worm had breached Apple's systems via a malicious email and spreading through an update, compromising the PII and bank accounts of most American citizens as well different areas of critical infrastructure.
- The worm utilized a powerful stolen tool from the NSA to breach Apple's systems but still be contained enough to only affect our country. It would also create a backdoor on any device it compromised to extract the needed information.



After some digging into the worm's code and metadata, it appears to be of Russian origin from a criminal organization that is heavily connected to the Russian government.



Consequences/Damage Dealt



- Billions of dollars for the number of damaged Apple devices and different areas of infrastructure significantly damaged
- Data leakage of hundreds of millions of citizens due to the rapid spread of the worm
- Severely halted people's access to the internet due to network infrastructure being damaged
- Compromised critical infrastructure such as hospitals, energy, and finance.

Incident Management Agencies



Executive Office of the President - Plays the role of national response after the initial attack to determine the best course of action with the support of other agencies.

DHS - A significant coordinator with the President, managing federal agencies, and working with FEMA

CISA - Collaborates with the DHS for asset and incident response as well as coordinating with the public and private sector affected companies

FBI - The lead investigative force in collaboration with the DOJ and other agencies.

NSA - Focuses on containment of the worm as well as using other tools to understand the circumstances

DOJ - The National Security and Criminal Divisions would be working to establish the legal action against the criminal organization

DoD - Would be the first line of defense for the attack, utilizing the Defend Forward strategy and supporting the FBI's investigation

DOS - Connects with foreign governments to alert them and learn if the worm spread outside of the U.S.

Responding Agencies



FBI's National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) - Collects evidence in order to begin establishing attribution

CISA - Sends out teams of cyber security experts and utilizes the NCIRP

DoD's Cyber Command - Utilized to protect critical federal assets via collaboration with agencies

DOJ - Would support the FBI in its investigation along with legally support the afflicted companies

FEMA - Collaborating with critical infrastructure companies and the DHS to mitigate their damage

NSA - Analyzes the malware and develop a solution to get networks back to previous operations

Private Sector Companies - Companies involved in critical infrastructure, as well as affected by the initial attack

Response Weaknesses

- Extended response time of Agencies and Apple to communicate updates
- Too many cybersecurity professionals were stretched to their limit with the attack
- The initial attack caused communications problems between agencies

Response Corrections

- Have the Executive Office create concern relief response for the public for greater transparency.
- Invest in more cybersecurity professionals within federal agencies and national-level exercises
- Foster collaboration with the DHS and NSA to develop a national incident response plan.

Clarifications or Questions?

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