


The following sample with the “Mirai” tag was selected.



The table below shows all malware samples that have been identified by MalwareBazaar as **Mirai** (max 1000).

Show entries


Search:

Firstseen (UTC)	SHA256 hash	Tags	Reporter
2026-03-10 06:49:51	183c7a7607fb4bfbdedc...	elf mirai	abuse_ch
2026-03-10 06:15:12	538dd5e7791ab04d0b4f...	elf mirai	abuse_ch
2026-03-10 06:11:37	7b615e12aba11915629...	elf mirai	abuse_ch
2026-03-10 05:41:07	8751287724a8d1f22329...	elf mirai	abuse_ch
2026-03-10 05:32:21	d104de180e0bd17c476...	mirai	adliwahid
2026-03-10 05:30:42	3ee6a40138eae3dd869...	mirai	adliwahid
2026-03-10 05:26:05	98a0bbcbe417481e48d...	elf mirai	abuse_ch
2026-03-10 04:49:50	6488ff7929c4313e9d9e...	elf mirai	abuse_ch
2026-03-10 04:22:34	108a9fd100e056b2bcec...	elf mirai	abuse_ch
2026-03-10 03:41:12	6bab957764149d659c9...	elf mirai	abuse_ch
2026-03-10 03:09:37	ad5255fb2c4b8a29c47b...	elf mirai	abuse_ch
2026-03-10 02:33:10	6eeb520a139786c3d43...	elf mirai	abuse_ch

The sample is present in the VM’s downloads folder.

```
(gregory@kali)-[~/Downloads]
└─$ ls -l
total 96
-rw-rw-r-- 1 gregory gregory 96841 Mar 10 03:02 183c7a7607fb4bfbdedc8ac29f56dc44833c79d671bb20f6e88ed2dd32a12578.zip
(gregory@kali)-[~/Downloads]
└─$
```

The only indicator of compromise was the sample’s hash value.



		HTTP Requests	1	Connections	9	DNS Requests	15	Network Threats	0			
	NETWORK	Timeshift	Protocol	Rep	PID	Process name	CN	IP	Port	Domain	ASN	
	NETWORK	BEFORE	TCP	✓	-	-	✘	91.189.91.98	80	connectivity-...	CANONICA	
	NETWORK	BEFORE	UDP	✓	456	avahi-daemon	?	224.0.0.251	5353	-	-	
	FILES	BEFORE	TCP	✓	-	-	✘	91.189.91.49	80	connectivity-...	CANONICA	
	FILES	BEFORE	TCP	✓	-	-	✘	79.127.211.89	443	odrs.gnome...	CDN77_	
	FILES	BEFORE	TCP	✓	-	-	✘	185.125.188.54	443	api.snapcraft...	CANONICA	
	FILES	BEFORE	TCP	✓	-	-	✘	91.189.91.49	80	connectivity-...	CANONICA	
	FILES	8690 ms	TCP	✓	473	snapt	✘	185.125.188.57	443	api.snapcraft...	CANONICAL	

		HTTP Requests	1	Connections	9	DNS Requests	15	Network Threats	0			
	NETWORK	Timeshift	Status	Rep	Domain	IP						
	NETWORK	BEFORE	Responded	✓	odrs.gnome.org	79.127.216.204						
	NETWORK					195.181.170.18						
	NETWORK					37.19.194.80						
	FILES					195.181.175.41						
	FILES					212.102.56.178						
	FILES					2a02:6ea0:c700:19						
	FILES					2a02:6ea0:c700:101						
	FILES	BEFORE	Responded	✓	odrs.gnome.org	2a02:6ea0:c77a:47						
	FILES					2a02:6ea0:c77a:48						

		HTTP Requests	1	Connections	9	DNS Requests	15	Network Threats	0			
	NETWORK	Timeshift	Class	PID	Process name	Message						
	NETWORK	No data										
	FILES	No data										

IOCs

Summary of indicators of compromises **1**

Copy selected

Main object – 183c7a7607fb4bfbdedc8ac29f56dc44833c79d671bb20f6e88ed2dd32a12578.zip

?	SHA256	183c7a7607fb4bfbdedc8ac29f56dc44833c79d671bb20f6e88ed2dd32a12578.zip
		c2c673a50be836ada153e9b528fb73d05b92f469d62d19dc08b411b9c2d19ed3

Behavior activities

Add for printing

MALICIOUS

No malicious indicators.

SUSPICIOUS


No suspicious indicators.

INFO

Checks timezone

- 7z (PID: 1984)
- file-roller (PID: 1969)

Find more information about signature artifacts and mapping to MITRE ATT&CK™ MATRIX at the [full report](#)



MITRE ATT&CK Matrix											
Tactics 1 Techniques 1 Events 2											
Enterprise & Mobile tactics											
Danger (0) Warning (0) Other (2)											
Initial access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege escalation	Defense evasion	Credential access	Discovery	Lateral movement	Collection	C & C	Exfiltration	Impact
						System Time Discovery 2					

From the analysis, little malicious activity was found. The program appears to simply find basic information about the system's time and location. Perhaps a longer or more in-depth analysis would reveal an attempt to connect to a larger botnet, but this seemingly did not occur during the current analysis. Though little is immediately apparent about this malware sample, Mirai, as a whole, has several notable characteristics. The malware aims to infect devices to add them to a botnet, which could subsequently be used to engage in distributed denial of service attacks, among others. The malware typically targets IoT devices which run on some distribution of Linux. As the infected device must communicate with the command and control server for instructions, the kinds of connections an infected device makes can be used to identify the presence of the malware. Frequent communications with unknown devices could indicate that the device is receiving instruction or, alternatively, being used to perform a DDoS attack.

The second malware sample is chosen with the “VIPKeylogger” tag.

Date	Hash	File Type	Tags	Uploader
2026-02-26 07:02	192460d60deb52c3cab...	exe	VIPKeylogger	FXOLabs
2026-02-25 14:32	0437a7bdffb3425189ef...	exe	VIPKeylogger, signed	adrian_luca
2026-02-25 07:25	d602128bef26396a9ce5...	exe	VIPKeylogger	threatcat_ch
2026-02-24 10:31	4bbdc2db8ebd024339f6...	exe	VIPKeylogger, signed	lowmal3
2026-02-24 09:07	5e70b2297e5a0048390...	exe	VIPKeylogger	threatcat_ch
2026-02-24 09:03	dbd4edd258813db2cac...	exe	VIPKeylogger	threatcat_ch
2026-02-24 08:11	d4f2c8d4ed30fe2b3396...	bat	VIPKeylogger	smica83
2026-02-23 15:00	2b320104efeed5369240...	tar	VIPKeylogger	FXOLabs
2026-02-23 11:56	0ac2b28cd85f9879f753...	js	VIPKeylogger	abuse_ch
2026-02-23 11:51	1e32a98bbd8eae6d357...	js	VIPKeylogger	abuse_ch
2026-02-23 11:51	a3a6bb7ebe6279e7b21...	js	VIPKeylogger	abuse_ch
2026-02-23 11:49	178a3a0f271b5eea6a98...	js	VIPKeylogger	abuse_ch
2026-02-23 10:32	938046c9235f3c5d7257...	exe	VIPKeylogger, geo, TUR	abuse_ch

Again, the sample can be found in the downloads folder.

```
Session Actions Edit View Help
(gregory@kali) - [~/Downloads]
└─$ ls -l
total 112
-rw-rw-r-- 1 gregory gregory 12697 Mar 10 03:19 0ac2b28cd85f9879f753199613c2884f1d46e877755099b6b4084be2a052279f.zip
-rw-rw-r-- 1 gregory gregory 96841 Mar 10 03:02 183c7a7607fb4bfbdedc8ac29f56dc44833c79d671bb20f6e88ed2dd32a12578.zip
(gregory@kali) - [~/Downloads]
└─$
```

This time, the malware has a much higher level of activity.

Timeshift	Headers	Rep	PID	Process name	CN	URL
9188 ms	H1 GET 200: OK	✓	8628	svchost.exe	Microsoft Corporation	http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/produ
9193 ms	H1 GET 200: OK	✓	8628	svchost.exe	Microsoft Corporation	http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/
18929 ms	H1 POST 400: Bad Request	✓	356	svchost.exe	Microsoft Corporation	https://login.live.com/ppsecure/devic
18931 ms	H2 GET 304: Not Modified	✓	6768	MoUsCoreWorker.exe	Microsoft Corporation	https://settings-win.data.microsoft.co
19168 ms	H1 POST 400: Bad Request	✓	356	svchost.exe	Microsoft Corporation	https://login.live.com/ppsecure/devic

HTTP Requests 30 Connections 23 DNS Requests 17 Network Threats 0											
Timeshift	Protocol	Rep	PID	Process name	CN	IP	Port	Domain	ASN		
BEFORE	UDP	✓	4	System	?	192.168.100.255	137	-	Not routed		
BEFORE	TCP	✓	7736	RUXIMICS.exe	🇺🇸	20.73.194.208	443	settings-win...	MICROSOFT		
BEFORE	TCP	✓	6768	MoUsocoreWorker.exe	🇺🇸	20.73.194.208	443	settings-win...	MICROSOFT		
BEFORE	TCP	✓	8628	svchost.exe	🇺🇸	20.73.194.208	443	settings-win...	MICROSOFT		
BEFORE	TCP	✓	-	-	🇳🇱	2.23.227.215	443	www.bing.com	AKAMAI-AS		
BEFORE	TCP	✓	-	-	🇺🇸	2.17.190.73	80	ocsp.digicert...	AKAMAI-AS		
BEFORE	TCP	✓	-	-	🇺🇸	204.79.197.203	80	oneocsp.mic...	MICROSOFT		

HTTP Requests 30 Connections 23 DNS Requests 17 Network Threats 0					
Timeshift	Status	Rep	Domain	IP	
BEFORE	Responded	✓	settings-win.data.microsoft.com	20.73.194.208	
BEFORE	Responded	✓	google.com	142.251.39.206	
BEFORE	Responded	✓	self.events.data.microsoft.com	13.89.179.10	
BEFORE	Responded	✓	www.bing.com	2.23.227.215	
BEFORE	Responded	✓	ocsp.digicert.com	2.17.190.73	
BEFORE	Responded	✓	oneocsp.microsoft.com	204.79.197.203	

HTTP Requests 30 Connections 23 DNS Requests 17 Network Threats 0					
Timeshift	Class	PID	Process name	Message	
No data					

IOCs

Summary of indicators of compromises **12**



Copy selected

Main object - 0ac2b28cd85f9879f753199613c2884f1d46e877755099b6b4084be2a052279f.zip

? SHA256	0ac2b28cd85f9879f753199613c2884f1d46e877755099b6b4084be2a052279f.zip d1d4b896afcc34ffa9ea281c109f06dbb90980044b7f62c5a9b1be252406612a
----------	--

HTTP/HTTPS requests (11)

? URL	http://ocsp.digicert.com/ MFEwTzBNMEswSTAJBgUrDgMCGGUABBTjrydRyt%2BApF3GSPypfHBxR5XtQQUs9tlpPmhxdIUkHMEWNPYIm8S8YCEAJTtAB8my1oj8MfWpz%2F7Y%3D
? URL	http://oneocsp.microsoft.com/ocsp/ MFQwUjBQME4wTDAJBgUrDgMCGGUABBBQ3L3%2F%2Fa6ADK8NraY2GXzVaYrHG4AQUb6t%2B2v%2BXQ3LsO2d33ojhNYhHQoUCEzMAAAAGb6jMMcOVb6sAAAAAAY%3D
? URL	http://ocsp.digicert.com/ MFEwTzBNMEswSTAJBgUrDgMCGGUABBBQ50otx%2FhOZtI%2Bz8SIP7wEWVxDIQUtIUIBIV5uNu5g%2F6%2BrkS7QYXjzkCEAz1vQYrVgLOerhQLCPM8GY%3D
? URL	https://login.live.com/ppsecure/deviceaddcredential.srf
? URL	http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crl
? URL	http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicSecSerCA2011_2011-10-18.crl
? URL	https://login.live.com/RST2.srf
? URL	https://settings-win.data.microsoft.com/settings/v3.0/WSD/WaaSAssessment? os=Windows&osVer=10.0.19041.1.amd64fre.vh_release.191706-

start winrar.exe
no specs

slui.exe
no specs

Initial access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege escalation	Defense evasion	Credential access	Discovery	Lateral movement	Collection	C & C	Exfiltration	Impact
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No indicators fall under the category

General Info

Add for printing

File name: 0ac2b28cd85f9879f753199613c2884f1d46e877755099b6b4084be2a052279f.zip

Full analysis: <https://app.any.run/tasks/3beb5e61-ddf7-4977-bd80-447cae5f709d>

Verdict: Malicious activity

Threats: **Keylogger**

A keylogger is a type of spyware that infects a system and has the ability to record every keystroke made on the device. This lets attackers collect personal information of victims, which may include their online banking credentials, as well as personal conversations. The most widespread vector of attack leading to a keylogger infection begins with a phishing email or link. Keylogging is also often present in remote access trojans as part of an extended set of malicious tools.

Malware Trends Tracker >>>

Analysis date: March 10, 2026 at 03:21:52

OS: Windows 10 Professional (build: 19044, 64 bit)

Tags: auto vipkeylogger keylogger arch-scr

Indicators:

Registry activity

Add for printing

Total events	Read events	Write events	Delete events
5 116	5 106	10	0

Modification events

PID	CMD	Path	Indicators	Parent process
7348	"C:\Program Files\WinRAR\WinRAR.exe" C:\Users\admin\AppData\Local\Temp\0ac2b28cd85f9879f753199613c2884f1d46e877755099b6b4084be2a052279f.zip	C:\Program Files\WinRAR\WinRAR.exe	-	explorer.exe

Information

User:	admin	Company:	Alexander Roshal
Integrity Level:	MEDIUM	Description:	WinRAR archiver
Version:	5.91.0		

Modules

Images

- c:\program files\winrar\winrar.exe
- c:\windows\system32\ntdll.dll
- c:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll
- c:\windows\system32\kernelbase.dll
- c:\windows\system32\user32.dll
- c:\windows\system32\win32u.dll
- c:\windows\system32\gdi32.dll
- c:\windows\system32\gdi32full.dll
- c:\windows\system32\msvc_p_win.dll
- c:\windows\system32\ucrtbase.dll

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

As its name would imply, VIPKeylogger is a keylogger, which attempts to obtain sensitive information from infected systems. Multiple executable files are run by the spyware, which appear to be made to capture keyboard and similar inputs from the target system. It seems as though several of the attempted connections aim to access Microsoft services, among other domains. Though it is difficult to determine with a cursory examination, this may be done to compromise one's use of these services, or as a way to forward obtained information back to the attacker.

Mirai and VIPKeylogger have several crucial differences in how they operate. VIPKeylogger is primarily focused on obtaining information from the target system, and does not truly seek to "take over" the device to use it for malicious purposes. Doing so, in fact, might impede its goal of information collection. Given that VIPKeylogger aims to collect passwords and other sensitive information typed by victims, evading detection is important for this malware. More intrusive actions, which could lead to detection, are thus avoided. Mirai, on the other hand, simply seeks to utilize devices in a wider botnet for further malicious activities. Due to their weaker nature and pervasiveness, IoT devices are thus appealing targets. Given that these are the primary devices targeted by Mirai, though, a keylogger function would likely have little practical benefit for these attackers. A victim would not be likely to access a banking application from their smart TV, for example. While both Mirai and VIPKeylogger are, of course, both prominent kinds of malicious programs, they do not possess many additional similarities beyond this.