There is nothing decisive about predicting conflict, or armed violence; when and where wars will be fought, why wars will arise, and most importantly how battles will be waged are all unanswerable questions. And yet, war and its technologies seem to always follow a pattern or more arguably a repeating cycle. Technology arises, whether for war purposes or for social reasons, and it evolves war into a new style of combat to which it will be successful. That technology will be worked upon and improved until all the opposing armies have a similarly powerful version, then they will not advance for a period until a new ground-breaking technology arises once more. It will also evolve a new way of fighting and will be successful and yet nations will cling to the old technology. This is the cycle. It has been repeated from phalanxes to rifles to nuclear weapons and now into the cyber battlefield. War is a contradiction in this way; it cannot be predicted on how it will be fought but the cycle of technology use is almost always repeated to an extent. David Sanger in his book The Perfect Weapon did not and cannot determine how cyberwarfare will look, but he has shown that the repeating cycle is already in effect. In this way, one can speculate more accurately what the future of warfare may hold.
Technology can come from a need of war or a desire of social life. It seems to flip back and forth constantly as to whether or not technology is shaping the future of war or war is shaping the future of technology. Nuclear weaponry was theorized and formed primarily by German and American scientists during the 1930s and 40s, even if later the same technology was used to produce clean energy it was originally developed as a weapon with war in mind. In this way war was the factor that pushed technology forward into a new era. However, even something as potent in killing as gunpowder it can be argued that it was the other way around in its invention. According to Jack Kelly in his book Gunpowder; Alchemy, Bombards, & Pyrotechnics the Chinese, though not the first to use an explosive-like powder, did create the closest ancestor to modern gunpowder but not for conflict. It was developed as a noise maker to scare away a mythical creature called a “shan” during their new year’s celebration primarily (Kelly 2-3). The key thing to understand with these examples is that war and social culture are intertwined. Weapons and technologies can come from just about anywhere and yet regardless they will shape more than just how wars are fought, they will shape cultures and people’s minds. War and culture are constantly affecting one another. Thinking back on nuclear weapons, after the bombing of Japanese cities one might assume that such an intense killing would result in remorse. Regardless of what some may have thought, the American “collective memory of World War II sees the war as ‘[their] finest hour.’ […] It was the most just of wars, the model war, the most righteous of wars” (Sherwin 1091). The culture and view point of war in the United States (U.S.) contradicted the aftermath of the nuking of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. U.S. culture praises sacrifice and justice, so such a violent act of war was overshadowed by a culture of heroism. The connection between culture and war is what begins the cycle of technology in war. Their intertwinement makes war technologies a social item as well. As new technology is presented, nations and their warfighters are hesitant to give up what has made them successful because it is a part of their culture.
Weaponized technology, regardless of if it was developed for war, has a serious impact on the culture of those who wield it and will thus causes them to cling to it. Around 1279 B.C. Rameses II began implementing chariots into his armies. The idea of an armored mounted unit was a welcome one to the Egyptian pharaoh. Though at this time the chariot in war terms was still early in its production and so the technology found itself with many flaws. It was not easy to steer, had insufficient additional protection of any kind, and most ineffective was that two operators were requires; one to steer the chariot and another to wield a weapon. Throughout the years the chariot would improve and be built upon, but after several hundred years it became obsolescent as cavalry was introduced. It was cheaper, easier to train in, and far more effective. A soldier on horseback could better maneuver and to an extent wield a weapon before the invention of the stirrup. Nonetheless, by this point chariots were not the optimal technology of war and yet they persisted. Even more so, they were still being advanced. Alexander Nefiodkin writes about the development of the scythe chariot or scythed “quadrigae” which was created in the mid-6th century B.C. (Nefiodkin 369) a full century after cavalry has been brought to the battlefield. Chariots at this point had been around for countless generations, they were apart of society and the people’s social image. They simply couldn’t disappear, even if they were less effective. The scythed chariot, the newest version of the outdated technology, was not even meant to rival or oppose cavalry. It was developed to better attack foot infantry (Nefiodkin 371). Certainly, the new scythed chariot was by no means useless or completely obsolete, but it was not the best choice for the job. Sanger writes of a similar thing. In the 21st century wars are customarily fought with armored tanks and helicopters, troops armed with rifles, and large naval battleships. However, the new technology of cyberspace is taking over and generals and tacticians are unsure of how to react. They “could picture conventional equipment like tanks, aircraft carriers, bombers, and satellites. But cyber [warfare …] left many of them a bit mystified” (Sanger 37-38). Just as the 6th century warriors wanted to stick to their chariots in the face of superior cavalry, many officials of today would rather stick with troops and tanks than try and understand cyberspace and its potential. Cultural connections can help one’s understanding of the current technology but it also hinders the adaption to new technologies, especially on the battlefield. Here the cycle of war technologies is reflected in both ancient history and the modern day. The introduction of new effective technology is always a hesitant transfer. Nonetheless, someone has to make the change for the cycle to continue.
Once an old technology has been outdated and new one introduced, effectiveness on the battlefield, and in the political realm, comes down to one primary variable; which technology to choose. As stated before, an army always has the option to stay with a technology that they know and are effective with and this won’t necessarily mean defeat. Also new technologies are developed all the time so it can be difficult to know which ones are truly the forefront of future warfare. Now with the introduction of the relatively new cyber battlefield, there are these same choices to be had. The U.S., as previously mentioned, has a culture of heroic war and often it is the bloodshed, heavy machinery, and large explosions that draws not only new entry-level recruits but also keeps high ranking strategists ever involved and prepared for war. Cyberspace on the other hand offers none of this, and yet its potential for destruction and dominating power are fully realized. Within the past decade the U.S. has already released two potent attacks on its enemies through cyber warfare; once during an operation titled “Olympic Games” on Iranian nuclear weapons facilities and again under the title “Nitro Zeus” in an effort to shut down entire cities in Iran (Sanger 7-11, 43-47). At this point it is certainly a realization that cyber warfare is fully effective even if it does not abide by traditional American culture. So, the internal conflict then becomes effectiveness as opposed to cultural integrity. One might argue that the U.S. has already adapted and there is no choice or internal conflict. However, the American military still has more than a majority of its assets invested in physical conflict and is only now moving towards the cyber battlefield. U.S. Cyber command, the military department meant to master and utilize cyber weapons, was only founded in 2009 and is still on the road to being fully developed. The U.S. finds itself with the choice of how much to invest into the new and unknown technology that could make military and political victories much closer or to continue to stick with its tanks and troops. The answer is not as obvious as one might think. Cyberspace is a new weapon and just because it had some brief successes does not guarantee that it will continue to do so. Sanger mentions this in his book when he discusses the involvement of private corporations with cyberspace. Companies like Google, Facebook, and Microsoft have been in the industry of cyberspace for several decades and are debatably more experienced with the technology than the National Security Agency (NSA) or U.S. Cyber Command. Regardless, they have determined that cyberspace is a wonderful tool for information and connection to electronics but still war is fought between humans and they do not exist on the cyber plane meaning cyber weapons will still have their limits (Sanger 244-256). The choice is not a simple one and presents the original concept; that conflict, specifically armed conflict, and its future are unpredictable by nature. It is likely that the U.S. will play out its future conflict by ear to see what will be more effective; traditional troops or cyber-attacks.
This is where the modern day resides and predictions of the evolution of war and technologies are indiscernible. However, the cycle of technology’s use continues and the next step is for opposing forces to equally match in power and development of the new technology. While this has not yet occurred in the sense that cyber weapons are the dominant tool in warfare, nations have been competing to match one another in strength on the cyber battlefield. The U.S. is by no means the only nation to develop cyber weapons and use them accordingly. As Geoffrey Parker wrote, “Examples of rapid invention followed by equally rapid imitation abound throughout the twentieth century” (Parker 416). Sanger writes almost exactly the same thing stating that the U.S.’ capabilities are no longer unique, “Russia and China have nearly matched America’s cyber skills” (Sanger 304). He later goes on to describe how China has succeeded in duplicating American attacks and devising many offensive and defensive cyber abilities of their own (Sanger 305-308). The key here is that multiple nations are mimicking each other and attempting to either get a one-up on an enemy or simply keep up with them. However, since cyber weapons are still completely in development and are certainly not near or at their peak ability, it can be safely said that this step in the cycle of technology use has not yet been achieved. Once all participants in cyber conflict have just about fully realized their abilities and are essentially equal then they will enter an era of technological stasis. This is the extent of one’s ability to predict the future of warfare and armed conflict. The questions first asked as to how, when, where, and why wars will be fought are a mystery to all, but the development of war technologies is a safe assumption as to where cyber warfare is heading. Those who are already at work in the cyber battlefield will continue to do so until they are all equally matched. Whether or not troops and physical equipment will be phased out or used more than ever is completely unpredictable. Culture does still play a role on the attachment of outdated technology so one can likely guess that troops will not soon be forgotten. Still yet, is the final step in the technology cycle and anyone’s ability to predict the future of technology and that is that cyberspace will not be the final step. Even if cyber weapons are fully adapted and accepted as the next big weapon in war, one can safely assume that they will not be the last technological advancement. After the nations have all reached what has been dubbed stasis, somehow somewhere a new even more effective technology at waging war will sprout up and the cycle will begin anew. Should however, cyberspace be abandoned as the next step in warfare sometime in the near future, then the rifles and tanks and helicopters will remain until a different technology emerges to take their place. In conclusion, war and armed conflict themselves as seen by Sanger and many other analysists are simply too unpredictable. They will be fought at unknown times and locations with unknown reasons and abilities. The advancement of technology however is quite understandable through a cycle that is affected and carried by the relationship of culture and choice to said technology. In short; no one can predict war, but anyone can predict relatively closely how technology will be accepted or denied in war.
Bibliography
Kelly, Jack. Gunpowder: Alchemy, Bombards, and Pyrotechnics: The History of the Explosive That Changed the World. Basic Books, 2005.
Nefiodkin, Alexander K., “On the origin of scythed chariots”, Historia: Zeitschrift fur Alte Geschichte, n. 3, 2004, pp. 369-378
Parker, Geoffrey, “The future of Western warfare”, in The Cambridge History of Warfare (Cambridge University Press, 2006) pp. 413-432.
Sanger, David E. The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age. SCRIBE, 2018.
Sherwin, Martin J., “Hiroshima as politics and history”, J. of American History, December 1995.