War is something that has always existed. It has changed and evolved time and time again throughout history but one thing is absolute; the human tendency to afflict violence upon one another. A single violent man may be considered a murderer and likely to be diagnosed with psychiatric problems, but a uniformed and well executed action of violence is considered honorable and heroic by the state. It is then only logical to ask; what defines war? What separates a righteous armed conflict between states from a group of lunatics on a killing spree? Certainly, the answer is of course subjective. What one nation may consider warfare another might title as a “police action.” Just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, so too are the limits and boundaries of what makes warfare determined by whomever the speaker is. For a rather safe definition and one that is accepted by many first world nations however, one can turn to Carl von Clausewitz’s On War. The Prussian general watched first hand as Napoleon Bonaparte conquered all of Europe and attempted to move into Russia in 1812, claiming victory after victory. War was more than familiar to Clausewitz as was defeat. He put it very simply however, “War […] is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will” (Clausewitz 11). In other words, war is how one forces their will upon another. For all of history humans have been trying to force other people to do what they want. From small scale bullying to all out war, there is fundamentally no difference. When the opponent does not comply, one resorts to violence. However as prominent and intertwined as war is with mankind, one should consider the following; combat is not the best strategy to victory. To elaborate, war is in many minds equivalent to the sum of all battles. Many people, both educated on the topic and not, believe that to win wars one must win the most battles, both in numbers and influence, and then they have achieved victory over their opponent. In many historical cases such as been the case, but any statistician knows; correlation does not equal causation. That is to say that one may have been victorious and also won the most battles, or even only the most important battles, but that does not imply that one event caused the other. Even with only Clausewitz’s definition of war, it can be assumed that armed conflict isn’t necessary at all. The underlying notion here being that war always has been and will continue to be a close part of the human world, but armed conflict is by no means required. In many cases, it will even hinder one’s chances at victory.
As prominent as war is and has always been, there have been countless scholars and generals who have tried and, in some cases, succeeded in devising how to win every time. Of these generals and scholars there are two primarily that one should always consider for a solid foundation in the understanding of how to conduct warfare; the aforementioned Carl von Clausewitz and his book On War and the eastern counterpart Sun Tzu and his exceptionally well-known writings The Art of War. Clausewitz was, of course, a first hand witness and participant in the Napoleonic Wars where as Sun Tzu lived between the 5th and 6th century BCE in Zhou China. His personal existence and contribution to the conflicts of the Zhou Dynasty are debated among historians, but are exceptionally irrelevant within the topics of war fighting as his doctrine and writings are recognized throughout the world. Already having a grasp on what makes up warfare to understand why armed conflict should and can be avoided, one must also understand how wars are fought. Clausewitz gave the ground work of the reasoning on why wars are fought, but so too does he and Sun Tzu present the answer as to how. To term what their writings are, they can loosely be called a form of doctrine. Many nations create and utilize some form of rule book to tell their generals and commanders when and how to attack or defend themselves in great detail. These rules or guidelines are referred to as doctrine. On War and The Art of War are much more generalized so that they can be adapted to different locations and cultures, and for different time periods. They still are a form of doctrine but do not fully fall under what most nations today call their military doctrine. For one to rise to the rank and position of general or commander, they must of course understand how to fight war and the most very basic step that one is to achieve according to Clausewitz and Sun Tzu is have the upper hand (Clausewitz 54, Sun 16).
Now Clausewitz goes into much more depth by stating the importance of preparation (Clausewitz 54). He explains how war is a constant push and pull, if it is favorable for one side to attack then it is favorable for the other to defend and vice versa. The strategy of war is all about reading the enemy and understanding not only what to do but also and more importantly when to do it. When the enemy retreats, then it is best to pursue. When the enemy pursues it is best to retreat (Clausewitz 26 – 29). This is because the upper hand or the imbalance of power is not in play. If both sides are equal either in force or in activity, then the battlefield will be a constant pushing and pulling. This is why it is of course favorable to simply be able to overpower the enemy. If one general has forces well beyond the size and strength of his enemy then the war can be easily and quickly won so long as the general is not a fool with his forces. And thus, the most basic strategy of all warfare is presented; be stronger than the opponent. Strength in this case however has different interpretations. Sun Tzu certainly doesn’t disagree with Clausewitz by any means however, his focus is much more so on the advantages of deception and intelligence. Sun Tzu says that a general who knows his forces like the back of his hand already is far superior to one who does not regardless of the sizes of their armies. He also emphasizes knowing the enemy even better than one’s self. If a general knows the enemy and what he will do then the battle is already won, again regardless of actual military strength (Sun 13 – 15). The key factor to take away from all of this is that Strength is important in battle both in physical forces and in mental understanding, the latter of the two being more influential towards the outcome of the battle. It is a simple concept to grasp but what many don’t understand is why strength is so needed. With the human culture centering so heavily around the idolizing of warfare, one might think that strength is important so that a vicious and heroic battle may be fought, but such is not the case. A general wants strength in numbers and intelligence for one reason only; so that the battle may be short and armed conflict will be minimalized.
Even from the very beginning in their fundamentals of how to understand and fight warfare, Clausewitz and Sun Tzu are preaching the avoidance of battle. From the intro of both doctrines it is assumed that armed conflict will come within the war, and thus one should plan accordingly to keep the battle, should it come, as short as possible. Sun Tzu writes, “when you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men’s weapons will grow dull and their [enthusiasm] will be damped” (Sun 10). The first rule Sun Tzu makes in understanding armed engagements is to make them as short and clean to victory as possible. Even so, the far more desirable outcome is to completely avoid battle all together. In Clausewitz’s Book II: The Theory of War he spends the entire time explain proper understandings of how the war will go and preparations of armies and strategies before any conflict occurs. His underlying theory that if one prepares and utilizes their resources properly the final outcome of armed conflict or battle can be avoided (Clausewitz 54 – 68). Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz speak of first preparing troops and then having well executed strikes and actions to disrupt the enemy. They encourage destroying resources and supply lines, because without food, water, and weapons the enemy cannot fight. They say it is best to eliminate outlying single small units, because it takes little effort and danger and whittles down the enemy’s numbers. Just like a king in chess, Sun Tzu proposes that if one can immediately reach the leader or commander of the enemy army than they should act to do so, because once again the war will be over before fighting has even began. Clausewitz goes so far as to say that if one can simply convince the opponent to agree to their terms than it is best to avoid the war in its entirety all together. If one takes nothing else away from all the tactics and strategy within Clausewitz and Sun Tzu’s work they should understand this; every action and plan should be designed to lead one to victory as soon and as easily as possible, and that battle in its chaotic and vicious form should only be used as a final resort and only if one is certain of victory. In other words, don’t used armed conflict unless it’s the only way to victory; it’s a last resort. Every action and attack should lead to lessening the total battles that need to be fought.
Consider the following; the first World War had multiple large and destructive battles and the war ultimately achieved very little, while the Cold “War” did not fight any direct battles between the United States (U.S.) and Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) and yet the victor still achieved their goal. According to historians World War I, or the Great War as it was once called, was an absolute blood bath of historical battles with over 9 million lives taken and around 21 million more injured as a result, and politically speaking nothing was achieved. The U.S. alone saw 116,000 deaths and 204,000 severely injured (Selikowitz 2). To fully understand the outcomes and meaning of World War I’s end one must know how it began. While many conflicts find themselves the product of heated debate and uncompromising view points of different states that have and are willing to use armies to back their points, the war that took place in Europe in the early 1900’s had very little political or philosophical meaning. The American Revolution was fought over taxation without representation, the Second World War was fought to stop a rising hate-filled empire, and even the Vietnam War was an attempt to stop communism from spreading. World War I on the other hand, did not have a clean-cut answer. With the industrial revolution and rise of nationalism, many states in and around Europe were expecting nearby empires to begin attacking for the conquest of land and resources and so alliances were formed between just about all the major powers. Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria were allied, and France, Great Britain, and Russia found themselves on similar terms. However, as long as each nation were to hypothetically stay within their own boundaries and keep civil on the international playing field then there would be no war and no conflict; their alliances would be merely for safety. However, Serbia and Austria-Hungary did not get along, and were constantly at each other’s throats until the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. A relatively small event on the world scale that only involved two nations; Serbia and Austria-Hungary, and yet the entire western world went to war over it, all because nations were backing each other out of fear and little to no concern for political gain. Clausewitz’s definition of war would almost not even consider World War I a war. According to the definition mentioned earlier, war is basically an extension of politics. Nations and their leaders will discuss and bargain to get others to do what they want and once diplomacy fails, a state will take to the battle field to enforce their political desires. In the Great War there were no out right politic desires. The alliances were first formed for safety and possible conquest; a need to keep one’s land and maybe take someone else’s. Yet when one nation went too far, it cost the entire continent and then some to get involved and yet they wanted nothing. France, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and Bulgaria were all essentially fighting to keep themselves safe, and when the opportunity presented itself maybe expand their borders, and yet none of that was achieved. Germany initially took land from the French but eventually lost it once they lost the war, and of course no one was safe as so many lives were lost and lands destroyed through the new found technologies of superior artillery, mechanized tanks, and gaseous weapons. The participants of the First World War took to the battle field in true western fantasized fashion with large explosions and heavy armor, and they accomplished nothing. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz warned that battle should be used only when all else has failed, instead all of Europe sought to destroy one another and did so without even attempting to force their own will upon others. It was meaningless violence; something Sun Tzu specifically detests. “In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good” (Sun 13).
With the establishment of battle being useless without proper reasoning behind it, then one wonders of the complete opposite; can a war be won without ever conducting traditional battle? For an answer, one need to look no further than the Cold War; a civil conflict of sorts that took place between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. in the aftermath of the Second World War. In the mid-20th century a fascist Nazi Germany caused all the western world to break out into war. With the threat looming around Europe and by extension most of the world, two nations that would normally not be allies were forced to work together to stop the Nazis. Those nations being the democratic United States and the communist Soviet Union. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. had vastly opposing viewpoints in politics and nationalism but with something so dangerous as the German armies between them, they initially thought little of it. It was not however, until the fall of the Nazi party and Germany that issues began to arise. When all the world agreed that Germany needed to be watched and restructured, it came down to a large political debate of sorts. The U.S.S.R. wanted to extend its communist party and beliefs into all of Eastern Europe and occupied Germany and eventually to the entire world. The U.S. having a strong foundation in human rights and freedom of choice, did not at all agree with the Soviet Union’s ways (Waltz 6 – 9). Contrary to the First World War, this conflict was strictly devised out of political disagreement. Two nations of views that lied on opposite sides of the spectrum wished to extend their political power to the other. This is exactly how Clausewitz describes war; two nations wanting to force their will upon the other. So as a good general would suspect, the two nations went to war, but not in the traditional sense.
First one must understand that there was of course the threat of actual battle and conflict. One of the largest factors of the Cold War between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. was the arms race. Both nations took to building the most numerically and most powerful weapons they could devise in an effort to scare the other into submission and away from any form of physical attack. With the recent development of nuclear weapons, both nations equally poured sources into building nuclear warheads. During the peak of the war, the U.S. had just over 30,000 warheads and the U.S.S.R. had roughly 40,000 (Rossenfeld 3 – 9). Clearly traditional battle in the form of armed conflict was on both nation’s minds, but they stuck to the Clausewitzian and Sun Tzu idea of waiting until it was absolutely necessary. There were however, actual battles fought during this time. The U.S. did engage in the Vietnam War and Korean War in an effort to stop the communist spread which was being backed by the U.S.S.R. and its allies. These conflicts, though caused by the Cold War, were not directly involving the U.S.S.R. and thus the two large players of the Cold War were not at ends with each other in these armed conflicts. The basic idea here being, that both sides of the Cold War were prepared and to a certain extent engaging in traditional battle, but at no point did they do so with each other.
The Cold War instead consisted of a series of scientific and political events and achievements in an effort to bully the opponent into submission or cause them to harm themselves economically until they can no longer be a threat. One of the most important “battles” that took place was the events that were known as the space race. During the height of the cold war, both nations had already become obsessed with trying to reach the stars and travel through space but now that they were at ends with each other, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. used it as a means of attacking the other. In an effort to better spread their own political beliefs each nation had to show its complete and utter dominance, and so they began to, in a way, flex their might by proving who could accomplish the greater task. The U.S.S.R. lead the way by sending up the first satellite and first person in space, though the U.S. was not far behind. The U.S.S.R. however did not properly prepare for such a battle as this. The space race, combined with the arms race and support of different indirect armed conflicts was taxing on both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. financially. however, it bled the Soviet Union out first. The U.S. succeeded in landing the first men on the moon on the 20th of July, 1969 while the soviets struggled to keep their economy from collapsing due to all the enormous spending used to contribute to the Cold War (Scott 231 – 237). Soon the Cold War would be considered over. In the late 1980’s Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary to the Soviet Union during the period where their economy was already slipping. Seeing that there wasn’t anything in the works that would save the Soviet Union without almost completely halting the arms and space production, Gorbachev moved for peace as he and Ronal Reagan, President of the United States, signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which in essence ceased the arms race by declaring a peace between the two nations (Gaddis 17 – 22). Spending and flexing on one another also came a stop as the wave of communism coming from the Soviet Union could no longer continue. Funding for international movements to spread their political ideology was ceased as the Soviet Union focused inward on its own economy. Thus, the Cold War was over and between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. not a single battle of armed conflict was fought. According to many nations to include the U.S. and Soviet Union, the Cold War is not technically a war at all, but Clausewitz would disagree. Both nations were looking to extend their political power and will upon the other, and since diplomacy had failed, they were resorting to unconventional ways of attacking one another. Though one question can be arisen and still debated to this day; did anyone actually win the Cold War? Since the Soviet Union had to back out due to their economic standing while the U.S. stood strong, one would say that the U.S. was victorious. However, they did not succeed in spreading democracy to other nations to include the U.S.S.R. as was their initial intentions. The U.S. didn’t suffer serious loss, but neither did they achieve their ultimate end goal. The U.S. did however halt the spread of communism and they did so without battling the Soviet Union. The underlying theme being that one can extend their political influence and achieve a victory in war as Clausewitz describes it without engaging in battle through armed conflict.
In 1989 U.S. strategic analysts to include William S. Lind attempted to characterize historical warfare and predict what the future would hold. They ended up creating a model of what they called generational warfare, separating the different styles of war into three previous generations and one generation as a prediction of future warfare. In essence the first three generations are as follows; the first generation comes with the development of infantry or organized foot soldiers. With this development interstate war became very noticeable and recognized in opposition to personal violence. The next generation comes with the development of field artillery or indirect fire. With gunpowder and rifles coming into the battle field, the coordination of explosive power at its peak was revolutionary and require war to adapt from its simple infantry company marching into another infantry company. The third generation that had been recognized at this point was in a way the perfection of cavalry. More accurately it can be called effective rapid movement. With mechanized vehicles and the invention of radios, communication and mounted movement became pivotal and changed once again how warfare was conducted (Lind 1 – 2). This was all helpful in understanding how war had evolved and changed but it was the prediction that was most critical. Unfortunately, in 1989 the U.S. was not as open to the idea of a new style of warfare, because Lind and his team had predicted very accurately what was coming. Fourth generation warfare is what is called insurgency. According to Lind in his initial article posted in the Marine Corps Gazette entitled The Changing Face of War; Into the Fourth Generation, this new generation was all about avoiding head on conflict. Participants of fourth generation warfare would actively seek to not engage in traditional armed conflict and instead would target the opponent’s cultures, key resources, and support amongst their people. Fourth generation warfare is all about attacking the enemy while never entering battle (Lind 2 – 4). That should sound excessively familiar. Lind and his team’s analysis and prediction are almost directly paralleling Sun Tzu and Clausewitz’s outlook on the battlefield. Both speak of avoiding conflict and only using traditional battle as a last resort when victory is imminent.
When Lind’s article was first published it drew little attention, as third generation warfare was all anyone knew and was still very much so active around the world. However, American termed terrorism was on the rise from the middle east and would soon draw everyone’s eyes to fourth generation warfare. With different attacks on U.S. soil placed under the umbrella of terrorism, prominently the attack on the twin towers in 2001, it was clear that the U.S. had enemies who were not willing to engage in traditional battle. Likely due to the U.S.’ superior fire power and technology, these underfunded terrorist organizations did not wish to attack head on. Instead they turned to what Lind had predicted; fourth generation warfare or insurgency. Organizations like Al-Qaeda and ISIS used the Islamic background of many middle eastern nations to gather and control their peoples and front large first world nations, primarily the U.S., as a mutual enemy. The U.S. knowing only third generation and earlier warfare as their means of winning war, went to invade Iraq in 2003 thinking it would be a simple and quick engagement as the extremists were by no means equal in fighting power to the world super power, the U.S. However, conflict did not occur as the American military had predicted. The Iraqi and Islamic insurgents were much more prone to hit-and-run tactics and to utilizing traps in the form of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) buried under high traffic routes. The key issue being that very rarely would the terrorists, as they were dubbed by the American populous, ever actually attack head on. The American military was not properly prepared for this and thus their attention turned back to Lind and his team’s analysis of fourth generation warfare.
The U.S. was by far more militarily and financially powerful than any nation in the middle east and certainly any organization that formed within one. However, the U.S. was not finding victory as swiftly and directly as they had thought because the enemy was utilizing the strategy of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz even if they weren’t fully aware of it. Where Sun Tzu speaks of attacking only when it is absolutely necessary, the insurgents took to heart. They did not seek out traditional battle because it did not suit their needs. Sun Tzu also says to attack the enemy in unconventional methods such as through understanding and manipulating the local culture (Sun 29 – 30). This is the toughest part of fighting the insurgents in the middle east because they are constantly convincing the locals that foreigners are the enemy. They have mastered the art of manipulating the highly religious and vastly uneducated population to their will to wage war with the overpowered enemy through culture and attrition. No one wants to, or feels safe, staying in an area where they are not welcome by the masses. The U.S. has been in and out of the middle east dealing with different insurgencies since 2003 and it continuing to do so to this day. Victory is not what the U.S. thought it would be. However, the American military has taken an approach to fighting the insurgents by using similar tactics. The U.S. has spent the past several years attempting to make peace with and help the locals in the areas where they are fighting insurgents. They are offering assistance and sending civil affairs units to conduct cultural missions. The U.S. is adapting to the indirect battles of fourth generation warfare. A massive powerful military super power has been struggling to take care of underground extremist groups for well over a decade, because battle in its heroic traditional sense is not effective against the indirect warfare of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz.
To look even further into the avoidance of battle, consider cyberwarfare; the current peak of technology in war. The modern world is in the age of cyber technology where events and correspondence take place in a space completely separate from the physical world. Since the mid 1900’s the development of a smart machine that can think and process different problems has blown the minds of people all around the world. In 1983 when intercomputer networking began to surface and rapidly spread, technology took another leap even further as the internet was born. Not only does every first world nation across the globe have computers that can process information at unequalled speeds, but so too can they all communicate with one another almost instantaneously. It is both an awesome and a fearsome concept. With this new technology though, there also came about a new way of waging war. Nations now can send messages but also programs to one another that can cause irreversible harm. David Sanger in his book The Perfect Weapon discuss just this in America’s most recent history. The U.S. in 2006 launched what they called Operation Olympic Games; a virus of sorts that targeting very specific computers used by Iranians in their nuclear facilities. It essentially, when under the proper conditions, causes the cooling systems of any nuclear devices to have a meltdown and catastrophic failure (Sanger 7 – 11). This was one of the first cyber attacks launched between nations and while the U.S. and Iran were not technically at war, it may still be considered such. Clausewitzian war is all about forcing one’s will upon another and that is precisely what the U.S. did. Using the latest in technology in a completely non-physical world, the U.S. forced their will upon Iran by halting or at least severely slowing down their nuclear program. This attack by all means was not an act of diplomacy but still a force of one’s will. This opened the door however for much of the world. It was now realized after the attack of Olympic Games that the cyber-battlefield was a real and devastating one. Nations all across the global playing field began to research and develop their own cyber weapons. Russia and China are continuously trying to hack into U.S. computers to steal information and leave behind harmful viruses. In response the U.S. is certainly trying to do the same with varying amounts of success on both sides. Sun Tzu said that war was all about knowing oneself and the enemy. “If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles” (Sun 15). This is precisely what these nations are doing. They wish to infiltrate into as much information as they can from the opponent. Not to mention, that each hacker is always attempting to cause damage where no more resources can be gained. At this point one should consider how many lives are at risk and how many lost during cyberwarfare. There are no casualties, at least not directly. Cyberwarfare is the epitome of conducting war without ever setting foot on the battlefield. If Sun Tzu and Clausewitz were around for such technology, they would by all means encourage its use to its fullest. That nations involved in cyberwarfare aren’t even at war with one another and yet they continue to constantly survey and attack each other, because there is so little risk and so much to gain. Just as the Cold War was conducted without armed conflict so too is cyberwarfare non-violent and yet so useful. Both are called “war” in their title and yet both seek to take as few lives as possible while spreading as much political influence upon others as they can. This is the meaning of war; to extend one’s politics and will, and by no means is death or violence even necessary.
War has been conducted for ages; since the beginning of written history. Mankind has continued and will continue to force his opinions and will upon those whom he deems necessary to do so. Yet, mankind has also always seen war as a violent and brutal manifestation of two opposing ideologies. It is not. War traditional may have been violent and lethal, but this does not mean it is required or even helpful. The Great War or World War I as it is not called was brutal to a fault, killing millions and ravaging lands and so little was ever accomplished. To call it a war can even be debatable as it was more of just unnecessary slaughter. While on the completely other hand the Cold War is not even considered such by most nations to include the two involved, and yet it was exactly what war is; two opposing political views trying to force the other to accept them as the right view. No battles were fought between the U.S. and Soviet Union, though the Cold War was a high-stakes conflict. There was no need for bloodshed as both super powers flexed their military might and scientific achievement until the U.S.S.R.’s economy couldn’t handle it anymore. The lack of a need for battle was even more so present when the U.S. tried to unofficially declare war on terrorism. The attempt to fight an insurgent group with a brutally powerful direct contact military was a failed one. American analysts had figured out years earlier that this new style of fourth generation warfare was coming and yet so few listened. The development and use of the new cyberwarfare also utilize the maximum gain in attempts to spread one’s political ideology without the risks to soldiers or civilians. A group behind the screens of computers can do damage and steal information without there ever being a battlefield.
Carl von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu were and still are two of the most influential and well-respected tacticians in history. Their writings and works are considered the foundation of many modern generals and strategists. So much on the battlefield is explained through them and yet their greatest advice was to avoid battle all together. War is an extension of politics and when diplomacy fails it is by no means necessary to kill the opponent in an effort to convince them of one’s superiority. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz present plenty of strategy to use on the battlefield to dispose of the enemy, but they do so sparingly stating that armed conflict must be quick and accurate. To wage long campaigns is foolish and will leave a general at a disadvantage. Though Clausewitz states if one can avoid combat all together then they are the better for it. One must always remember the reasoning for war; to force one’s will upon another. In this manner if one does not need to resort to battle, then they should be all means avoid it. With modern technology and fourth generation warfare this is becoming all too prevalent. War is absolute, but battle is optional.
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