{"id":345,"date":"2026-08-16T03:32:44","date_gmt":"2026-08-16T03:32:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/pierceferguson\/?page_id=345"},"modified":"2026-08-16T03:32:44","modified_gmt":"2026-08-16T03:32:44","slug":"case-analysis-on-csr","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/pierceferguson\/law-ethics\/phil-355e\/case-analysis-on-csr\/","title":{"rendered":"Case Analysis on CSR"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Introduction<\/strong><br>Ron Lieber\u2019s article, \u201cWhy the Equifax Breach Stings So Bad,\u201d describes the<br>helplessness and fear experienced by consumers after Equifax failed to protect their personal and<br>financial information. Equifax and other credit-reporting agencies collect data that consumers<br>cannot realistically leave, then use algorithms and credit scores to influence access to mortgages,<br>automobiles, employment, and other important opportunities. Consumers may also struggle to<br>correct inaccurate information contained in their credit reports. After the breach, many people<br>feared identity theft, financial losses, damaged credit, and harm to their reputations. Equifax<br>intensified these concerns through poor communication, its failure to notify affected individuals<br>directly, and its continued collection of fees from some consumers who attempted to freeze their<br>credit files.<br>The breach, therefore, harmed more than people whose information might eventually be<br>used by criminals; it also harmed consumers who were forced to spend time, money, and energy<br>protecting themselves from a failure they did not cause due to the lack of the corporation\u2019s social<br>responsibility (CSR). Remember, you can always change your credit card number, but you can<br>never change your Social Security Number. In this Case Analysis, with research provided<br>through Friedman and Anshen\u2019s works, I will argue that Confucianism shows that the Equifax<br>breach harmed consumers by exposing their personal information, threatening their financial<br>security, and undermining their trust in the credit-reporting system. This harm was morally<br>wrong because Equifax failed to fulfill its responsibility as a powerful steward of information<br>upon which most of the public was forced to depend.<br><br><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Friedman\u2019s Analysis of CSR<\/strong><br>Milton Friedman&#8217;s central argument is that the primary social responsibility of a business<br>is to increase its profits. According to Friedman, corporate executives are employees and agents<br>of the company\u2019s owners. Their responsibility is therefore to operate the business according to<br>the owners\u2019 wishes, which typically means maximizing profit while complying with the law and<br>ethical norms. Friedman was pretty skeptical of executives who use company resources to pursue<br>broad social causes because they are spending money that belongs to shareholders, customers, or<br>employees. In his view, political institutions should determine public policy, while businesses<br>should focus on operating successfully within the established rules of the market (Friedman,<br>1970).<br>At first, Friedman\u2019s argument may appear to excuse Equifax from any responsibility<br>beyond earning money and meeting minimum legal requirements. However, Equifax\u2019s conduct<br>fails even under Friedman\u2019s profit-centered standard. The company\u2019s business depended on<br>collecting, analyzing, and distributing sensitive consumer information. Protecting that<br>information was therefore not an unrelated charitable activity; it was part of Equifax\u2019s basic<br>business function. A company cannot successfully profit from personal data while treating the<br>protection of that data as an optional social expense. By failing to safeguard its systems and<br>respond effectively after the breach, Equifax damaged the trust and stability upon which its<br>business depended.<br>Lieber explains that consumers were trapped within the credit-reporting system and<br>generally had no practical ability to opt out. Equifax and similar agencies used personal<br>information to create credit scores that influenced mortgages, car loans, employment, and other<br>major opportunities. After the breach, consumers faced fears of identity theft, financial loss,<br>damaged credit, and ruined reputations. Many struggled to receive useful information from<br>Equifax, while some were initially charged fees to freeze credit files that Equifax itself had failed<br>to protect. This response harmed consumers while also exposing Equifax to reputational damage,<br>regulatory attention, legal costs, and long-term losses of public trust. Strong security and honest<br>communication would therefore have served both consumers and the company\u2019s financial<br>interests.<br>Friedman also warns that businesses sometimes use the language of social responsibility<br>as public-relations \u201cwindow-dressing\u201d while their actions are actually motivated by self-interest.<br>Equifax\u2019s response demonstrates the opposite problem: it failed to recognize that responsible<br>treatment of consumers was also necessary for its own long-term success. Instead of immediately<br>notifying affected individuals, providing reliable support, and offering free protection without<br>unnecessary obstacles, the company shifted much of the burden onto consumers. Even from a<br>profit-maximizing perspective, this was shortsighted. A company that depends on public<br>information and trust cannot treat security failures as someone else\u2019s problem.<br>Confucianism reveals why Friedman\u2019s framework is still incomplete. Friedman primarily<br>defines the executive\u2019s responsibility through the relationship between managers and<br>shareholders. Confucian ethics, however, emphasizes that people and institutions occupy several<br>relationships and roles at once. Equifax was not only an agent of its shareholders; it was also a<br>powerful steward of information belonging to millions of consumers. Because consumers could<br>not realistically leave the credit-reporting system, Equifax held far more power and knowledge<br>within this relationship. That unequal position created a greater responsibility to act with care,<br>honesty, competence, and respect.<br>The morally appropriate action would therefore have been to treat cybersecurity as a central duty rather than merely another operating expense. Equifax should have maintained stronger security systems, responded quickly and transparently, directly notified affected consumers, provided free and simple credit freezes, and offered meaningful assistance to anyone facing identity theft or inaccurate credit information. These actions would not have required Equifax to abandon profitability. They would have protected the relationships and trust necessary for the company to function legitimately. Friedman helps demonstrate that responsible security could serve long-term business interests, while Confucianism explains why Equifax owed protection to consumers even when doing so imposed additional costs.<br><br><strong>Anshen\u2019s Analysis of CSR<\/strong><br>Melvin Anshen argues that business and society are connected through an implicit social<br>contract consisting of reciprocal duties and expectations among corporations, governments, and<br>citizens. Because society\u2019s needs change over time, this contract is continually renegotiated.<br>Practices accepted in the past may therefore become unacceptable, requiring managers to<br>reconsider their responsibilities and adapt their organizations accordingly (Anshen, 1970, pp. 7\u2013<br>8).<br>Anshen contrasts this emerging social contract with an older model of corporate<br>responsibility. Under the old model, businesses were expected to maximize profit, compete<br>fairly, and obey existing rules. Economic growth was treated as the main source of social<br>progress, while problems such as pollution, unemployment, discrimination, and damage to<br>communities were left for individuals, charities, or governments to address. This allowed<br>corporations to receive the economic benefits of their activities while shifting many of their<br>social costs onto the public. Anshen argues that the emerging contract requires businesses to<br>consider economic and social progress together and accept responsibility for costs created by<br>their operations (Anshen, 1970, pp. 9\u201311).<br>The Equifax breach demonstrates the failure of the older corporate model. Equifax<br>profited by collecting, evaluating, and distributing consumers\u2019 financial information. Consumers<br>could not realistically opt out because credit reports influenced access to loans, housing,<br>automobiles, mobile phones, and some employment opportunities. When Equifax failed to<br>protect that information, consumers were forced to monitor accounts, freeze credit files, dispute<br>errors, and protect themselves against identity theft. They also experienced fear that their<br>finances, reputations, and future opportunities could be harmed. Some consumers were even<br>charged fees to freeze credit files that Equifax had failed to secure.<br>These consequences represent the externalized social costs Anshen criticizes. Equifax<br>received the financial benefits of controlling consumer data, while the public carried much of the<br>risk and recovery burden. Under Anshen\u2019s emerging social contract, cybersecurity should not be<br>treated merely as an optional internal expense. Because Equifax\u2019s business created the risk, the<br>company should have incorporated the cost of preventing and responding to breaches into its<br>operations.<br>Confucianism further explains why Equifax acted immorally. Confucian ethics<br>emphasizes reciprocal relationships, proper fulfillment of social roles, and the greater<br>responsibilities held by those with more authority. Equifax possessed far more knowledge and<br>control than the consumers whose information it collected. Consumers depended on the<br>company, but had little ability to leave the relationship or control how their data was handled. As<br>a powerful information organization, Equifax had a responsibility to act with competence, care,<br>and honesty. Its failure to protect consumers and assist them afterward violated that role and<br>weakened trust throughout the credit-reporting system.<br>Equifax should have invested in stronger security, directly notified affected consumers,<br>provided free and accessible credit freezes, corrected inaccurate records promptly, and supported<br>victims of identity theft. Its leaders should also have accepted responsibility instead of shifting<br>the burden onto people who never chose to place their data in Equifax\u2019s hands. Anshen argues<br>that businesses should help redesign the social contract rather than waiting for public outrage or<br>government intervention to force change (Anshen, 1970, pp. 12\u201314). Equifax failed because it<br>benefited from its powerful social position without fulfilling the obligations that accompanied it.<br><br><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><br>Corporations and organizations have grown increasingly careless about the<br>responsibilities that come with their power. The Equifax breach was immoral because it exposed<br>consumers to harm caused by circumstances beyond their control. Consumers could not<br>realistically opt out of the credit-reporting system, yet Equifax failed to protect the information<br>on which their opportunities depended. Friedman\u2019s argument shows that protecting consumer<br>data was part of Equifax\u2019s basic business responsibility because its profitability depended on<br>securely managing that information. Anshen\u2019s social contract goes further, showing that<br>corporations must accept the social costs created by their operations rather than shifting those<br>costs onto the public. From a Confucian perspective, Equifax also failed to fulfill its role as a<br>powerful steward of sensitive information. One objection is that no company can prevent every<br>cyberattack. However, this does not excuse weak preparation, poor communication, or forcing<br>victims to pay for protection afterward. No one man should possess unchecked power over<br>others, and the same principle should apply to corporations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>References<\/strong><br>Anshen, M. (1970). Changing the social contract: A role for business. Columbia Journal of<br>World Business, 5(6), 6\u201314.<br>Friedman, M. (n.d.). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. Corporate<br>Ethics and Corporate Governance, 173\u2013178. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1007\/978-3-540-70818-6_14<br>Lieber, R. (2017, September 22). Why the Equifax breach stings so bad &#8211; The New York Times.<br>https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2017\/09\/22\/your-money\/equifax-breach.html<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>IntroductionRon Lieber\u2019s article, \u201cWhy the Equifax Breach Stings So Bad,\u201d describes thehelplessness and fear experienced by consumers after Equifax failed to protect their personal andfinancial information. Equifax and other credit-reporting agencies collect data that consumerscannot realistically leave, then use algorithms and credit scores to influence access to mortgages,automobiles, employment, and other important opportunities. Consumers may&#8230; <\/p>\n<div class=\"link-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/pierceferguson\/law-ethics\/phil-355e\/case-analysis-on-csr\/\">Read More<\/a><\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":30972,"featured_media":0,"parent":207,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/pierceferguson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/345"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/pierceferguson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/pierceferguson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/pierceferguson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/30972"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/pierceferguson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=345"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/pierceferguson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/345\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":346,"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/pierceferguson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/345\/revisions\/346"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/pierceferguson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/207"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/pierceferguson\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=345"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}