{"id":299,"date":"2026-10-04T22:01:02","date_gmt":"2026-10-04T22:01:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/riley-copeland\/?p=299"},"modified":"2026-10-04T22:01:02","modified_gmt":"2026-10-04T22:01:02","slug":"the-human-factor-in-cybersecurity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/riley-copeland\/2026\/10\/04\/the-human-factor-in-cybersecurity\/","title":{"rendered":"The Human Factor in Cybersecurity"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Riley Copeland | 9\/27\/26<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center\"><strong>The Human Factor in Cybersecurity<br>What the Human Factor Means<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Cybersecurity isn&#8217;t just firewalls and encryption. Most breaches start with a person, someone makes a mistake like clicking a link or trusts a call they shouldn&#8217;t have. This is the &#8220;human factor,&#8221; the idea that people are as much a part of an organization&#8217;s attack surface as its tech. A strong network can still fail because of a distracted employee.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center\"><br><strong>How Behavior Creates Vulnerabilities<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>People take shortcuts because shortcuts are convenient. They reuse passwords instead of tracking a dozen unique ones, or click links quickly to clear their inbox. None of this is malicious it&#8217;s just normal behavior, but attackers build their tactics around it. Social engineering works by exploiting trust, urgency, and the instinct to be helpful. A system can be patched but a person&#8217;s instinct to trust a convincing email is harder to fix.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center\"><br><strong>Two Examples of Human-Driven Risk<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Phishing is the clearest example. An attacker sends a message that looks like it&#8217;s from a trusted source asking them to click a link or hand over credentials. It works because it looks routine like a message about a password expiring soon creates urgency and mimics something employees see all the time. Even trained employees fall for well-made phishing attempts because the message is built to trigger a fast response instead of careful thinking. One bad click can give an attacker a foothold into an entire network. Insider threats are the second example, and weak passwords are part of this. Most insider incidents aren&#8217;t malicious. Aldabagh et al. (2025) describe them as accidental like an employee sending a file to the wrong person or clicking a malicious link. Reusing a password across work and personal accounts is the same kind of shortcut, since a password breached on a personal account can give them access to your work account. The 2013 Target breach shows this: attackers got in through a single under protected computer at one of Target&#8217;s HVAC vendors and exposed more than 110 million customer records. As the reference put it, a company&#8217;s protection is only as good as its weakest link (Aldabagh et al., 2025). In both examples, the risk isn&#8217;t broken software its just human behavior.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center\"><br><strong>Reducing the Risk<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Telling employees to &#8220;be careful&#8221; doesn&#8217;t fix this. Training needs to be ongoing, not a slideshow every now and then, and it should cover regulatory and compliance basics, since Aldabagh et al. (2025) names employee knowledge of those requirements as a direct way to cut down on human error. Simulated phishing tests build real recognition skills instead of just awareness. 2FA addresses the weak-password problem directly, since a stolen password alone isn&#8217;t enough to get in. Reporting culture matters too: employees who make a mistake need to feel safe reporting it right away, or they will hide it, giving attackers more time to do damage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-align-center\"><br><strong>Why This Keeps Happening<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Shortcuts like trusting anything official looking or acting fast under pressure are exactly what social engineering exploits. Employees are also less likely to question a request that looks like it came from a boss which is why executive impersonation scams work so well. Culture affects this too. If leadership treats security as someone else&#8217;s problem, employees will too. When it&#8217;s built into daily workflow instead of treated as a hurdle, people take it seriously.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>Reference<br><\/strong>Aldabagh, H., Bowman, C., Kirkpatrick, C., Oesteraas, I., &amp; Yalpi, V. L. D. (2025).<br>Cybersecurity, technology &amp; society: An interdisciplinary look at the field of<br>cybersecurity. Self-published.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Riley Copeland | 9\/27\/26 The Human Factor in CybersecurityWhat the Human Factor Means Cybersecurity isn&#8217;t just firewalls and encryption. Most breaches start with a person, someone makes a mistake like clicking a link or trusts a call they shouldn&#8217;t have. This is the &#8220;human factor,&#8221; the idea that people are as much a part of&#8230; <\/p>\n<div class=\"link-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/riley-copeland\/2026\/10\/04\/the-human-factor-in-cybersecurity\/\">Read More<\/a><\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":32740,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":"","wds_primary_category":0},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/riley-copeland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/299"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/riley-copeland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/riley-copeland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/riley-copeland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/32740"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/riley-copeland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=299"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/riley-copeland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/299\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":304,"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/riley-copeland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/299\/revisions\/304"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/riley-copeland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=299"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/riley-copeland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=299"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.wp.odu.edu\/riley-copeland\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=299"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}