In “The Cover War for American Minds,” David Shedd and Ivana Stradner argue that Russia, China, and Iran are using disinformation to weaken American democracy. Their examples include Russian state media employees allegedly sending $10 million to a Tennessee-based media company, Russian bot farms using artificial intelligence to impersonate Americans, Iranian hackers allegedly stealing and leaking campaign information, and Chinese influence operations using fake American social media accounts. This list of efforts does not mainly attack voting machines or election infrastructure. Instead, they target public trust, voter judgement, and confidence in democratic institutions. The purpose is to deepen polarization, make Americans suspicious of one another, and weaken the United States from within. In this Case Analysis, I will argue that Ruism/Confucianism shows that these actions by Russia, China, and Iran do constitute information warfare because they use deception to damage the trust and relationships that make political order possible. I will also argue that these actions are not justifiable, and that if the United States used the same deceptive methods in Russa, China, or Iran, those actions would also be information warfare and would be unjustified.
Prier’s article helps explain why social media interference can count as information warfare even when it does not involve bombs or missiles, soldiers, or direct attack on infrastructure. Prier argues that modern cyber operations can target people’s beliefs and behaviors instead of only targeting machines. This central concept is “commanding the trend.” This means using social media algorithms, existing narratives, true believers, cyber agents/warriors, and bot accounts to make propaganda appear popular or organic. The goal is not simply to post opinions online, the goal is to manipulate what people see online, what they think others believe, and what topics become part of public trending debates.
Prier explains that propaganda works best when it connects to beliefs that already exist. It does not need to create a completely new worldview. Instead, it attaches itself to people’s fear, anger, resentment, or suspicion that is already present in society. Social media makes this a lot easier because people often exist in networks of like-minded users. If a message is repeated enough, especially by accounts that appear trustworthy or familiar, it can start to feel true. Bot networks and fake accounts can also push a message into trending topics, where it reaches people outside of the original audience. In this way, social media platforms can become weapons for shaping the public’s perception.
This concept applies directly to the case described by Shedd and Stradner. Russia’s alleged use of fake profiles, AI-generated material, manipulated videos, and websites that impersonate real media sources is an example of trying to command the trend. Iran’s alleged hacking and leaking of campaign information also fits Prier’s model because stolen material can be inserted into the information environment to shape political perception. China’s use of fake American personas also fits because the audience is supposed to believe that the message is coming from ordinary members of its own political community. These are not normal political disagreements. They organize foreign efforts to manipulate another society’s public conversation.
Ruism/Confucianism shows why these actions are unethical. Confucian ethics focuses on living according to the proper path, also known as dao, and fulfilling one’s role in a way that supports harmony. A good ruler or state should act with ren, meaning humaneness, and should follow li, meaning proper conduct. Another important Confucian idea is trustworthiness. A society cannot function well if people cannot trust whether public voices are who they claim to be. Election disinformation violates this because foreign governments pretend to be citizens, journalists, activists, or ordinary users. They are not acting openly in their proper roles as foreign states. They are hiding behind false roles to manipulate another community.
For that reason, these operations are unjustifiable. Persuasion itself is not wrong. A foreign country can openly criticize the United States or explain its position. However, secretly funding media content, using fake accounts, spreading false claims, or impersonating citizens corrupt public judgement. In Confucian terms, this violates the correction of names because people and institutions are not being presented as what they really are. The same judgment would apply to the United States. If the United States secretly used fake Russian, Chinese, or Iranian citizens, forged stories, hacked leaks, or bot networks to influence their elections, it would also be engaging in information warfare. Even if the goal seemed good the method would still damage social trust and move the United States away from the proper moral path.
Morkevicius gives another way to understand this case, she distinguishes between information-psychological warfare. Information-technical warfare attacks systems, such as power grids, financial records, or communications networks. Information-psychological warfare attacks perception. It tries to change how people view leaders, institutions, and political reality. This distinction matters because election interference may not look like ordinary war, but it can still be coercive. If a foreign state intentionally manipulates a population and weakens its ability to govern itself, then the action belongs in the space between peace and open war.
Morkevicius uses the concept of jus ad vim, or the ethics of force short of war, to judge actions in this gray area. Jus ad vim asks whether coercive action has just cause, right intention, legitimate authority, proportionality, necessity, and concern for order. She also distinguishes between denial and deception. Denial means withholding information, such as protecting one’s own networks. This is usually permissible because a state is not required to give its opponent useful information. Deception is more morally dangerous because it manipulates another person’s understanding of reality. Some concealment may be allowed, but lying, false identity, and fake sources are much harder to justify.
This distinction is useful for analyzing the actions of Russia, China, and Iran. Their alleged election interference is not simple denial or normal state messaging. It is deception, using fake profiles, AI generated personas, media impersonation, hacked leaks, and manipulated videos are designed to confuse voters about what is real and who is speaking. These tactics also target civilians directly. The main battlefield is not military base or government server. It is the mind of the voter and the trust between citizens. Under Morkevicius’s framework, that is a serious moral problem because the operation harms public order and makes peaceful political life harder.
Confucianism strengthens this criticism, in a Confucian view, political order depends on truthful roles and stable relationships. Citizens must be able to disagree without losing the basic trust that holds society together. When foreign states flood a society with lies, they encourage suspicion, resentment, and disorder. They also fail to act like morally responsible states. A ruler or government should cultivate harmony and proper conduct, not exploit another society’s divisions for advantage. Even if Russia, China, or Iran believe they are protecting their own national interests, their methods are still unethical because they intentionally damage another community’s moral and political order.
Morkevicius’s framework also shows why similar American actions would be wrong. The United States might claim that interfering in Russian, Chinese, or Iranian elections would be justified because those governments are authoritarian or because they interfere first. However, just cause does not automatically justify every method. The action must still be proportionate, necessary, and ordered toward peace. A campaign based on fake accounts, hacked leaks, forged documents, or false narratives would fail that test because it would harm civilians’ ability to know the truth. From a Confucian perspective, it would also damage America’s own moral roles. A state that claims to uphold democracy should not defend it by corrupting truth for other states.
My final position is that election interference by Russian, China, and Iran does constitute information warfare. Prier shows that social media can be weaponized by commanding trends, exploiting existing narratives, and using bots or false accounts. Morkevicius shows that information-psychological operations can be coercive events without physical violence, especially when they damage public trust. Ruism/Confucianism shows why these actions are unjust, they violate proper roles, undermine trustworthiness, and create disorder in political relationships. The same standard applies to the United States. A possible objection is that the United States must fight back against authoritarian influence operations. I agree that the United States should be able to respond morally, but not by copying deception tactics. Better responses would include public exposure, sanctions, cybersecurity, media literacy, and truthful support for free expression. Those methods defend democratic order without abandoning the moral path.
Work Cited
Prier, J. (2017). Commanding the Trend: Social Media as Information Warfare. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 11(4), 50–85. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26271634
Shedd, David, and Ivana Stradner. “The Covert War for American Minds.” Foreign Affairs, 29 Oct. 2024, www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/covert-war-american-minds.
Valerie Morkevičius, et al. Routledge Handbook of the Future of Warfare. Taylor & Francis, 19 Sept. 2023.