How should we approach the development of cyber-policy and -infrastructure given the “short arm” of predictive knowledge?

In order to establish policy and infrastructure, a number of important elements must be addressed in detail in this study. According to its nature and qualities, “cyberspace” is very sensitive and prone to vulnerability in its operation. It introduces the concept of “predictive knowledge” as an asset to this field of endeavor. Predictive knowledge uses a framework that may assess what would be considered reasonable action in this particular situation, which is based on the eudaemonic philosophy of control manipulation, over cyber assets. By concentrating on expected use-value (comparable to expected utility), we come closer to the objectives of creating (or arranging for the creation of) cyber-“weak points” or otherwise creating the conditions for acceptance by its most interested parties, as opposed to just anticipating them. Those who start with policy and infrastructure when thinking about “how to do cyber” are almost always missing important details. They are aware of the issues—the urgent need for “cyber-armies,” security certifications, deterrence by strength, and the emergence of an international cyber-security regime—but they are unable to predict how they will be solved. Government insiders, especially those who work in policy, embrace the idea that information technology (IT) is amorphous while acknowledging its susceptibility to malevolent agents and performance degradation from deliberate attacks.