The article Digital Battlegrounds: Evolving Hybrid Kinetic Warfare explains how modern conflict is increasingly blending traditional military operations with cyberattacks targeting digital infrastructure. Instead of only fighting on physical battlefields, states now use cyber tools to disrupt communication networks, financial systems, satellites, and even power grids. These cyber operations can weaken an opponent strategically without always requiring traditional military force. However, cyberattacks present unique ethical challenges because the systems they target are often interconnected and used by both military and civilian populations. When digital infrastructure is disrupted, the effects can extend far beyond the intended target, sometimes affecting hospitals, businesses, and everyday civilian life. This makes it harder to clearly separate combatants from noncombatants.

Both Michael Boylan in “Can There Be a Just Cyber War?”  Mariarosaria Taddeo in “An Analysis for a Just Cyber Warfare” explores whether cyberwarfare can meet the moral standards traditionally required for just war. Their analyses focus on issues such as proportionality, discrimination, responsibility, and the ethical limits of technological warfare.

Focusing only on the cyber actions described and setting aside the broader political conflict, this case analysis argues that virtue ethics shows these cyber operations could theoretically be part of a just war. However, the actions described raise serious ethical concerns because they risk violating virtues like prudence, justice, and restraint that are necessary for warfare to remain morally justified.

Michael Boylan’s article asks an important question: can cyberwarfare meet the moral requirements of a just war? Traditional just war theory relies heavily on principles such as discrimination and proportionality. Discrimination requires that military actions clearly distinguish between legitimate military targets and civilians. Proportionality requires that the harm caused by an action must not outweigh the military objective it is intended to achieve.

Boylan argues that cyberwarfare complicates both of these principles. In conventional warfare, soldiers and military targets are usually more clearly identifiable. Cyberwarfare, on the other hand, operates within digital systems that often serve both military and civilian purposes at the same time. A communications network might be used for military coordination while also supporting hospitals, businesses, and everyday personal communication. If that system is attacked digitally, the effects could spread far beyond the intended military target.

This is where virtue ethics provides a useful way of thinking about the issue. Virtue ethics focuses on the moral character and judgment of the decision-makers involved. Instead of only asking whether an action technically follows certain rules, virtue ethics asks whether the action reflects good moral character and wise judgment.

One of the most important virtues in this context is prudence, or practical wisdom. Prudence involves carefully considering the potential consequences of an action before taking it. In cyberwarfare, this virtue becomes especially important because cyber operations can have unpredictable ripple effects across interconnected systems. If decision-makers launch a cyberattack without fully considering how the damage might spread, they may unintentionally harm civilians or essential services. From the perspective of virtue ethics, failing to account for those risks would demonstrate poor judgment.

Another key virtue is justice. Justice requires fairness and respect for moral boundaries, even during conflict. In the context of warfare, justice involves a commitment to minimizing harm to civilians whenever possible. Cyberattacks that disrupt infrastructure such as electricity, communication systems, or financial networks could potentially harm large numbers of civilians who are not directly involved in the conflict. If those risks are ignored or treated as insignificant, the action may fall short of the virtue of justice.

Boylan suggests that cyberwarfare could theoretically meet just war requirements if it successfully maintains discrimination and proportionality. Virtue ethics supports that possibility but adds an additional layer of responsibility. Even if an operation technically satisfies those requirements, decision-makers must still demonstrate moral discipline and thoughtful judgment in how they conduct the attack.

Looking at the cyber operations described in the article, it becomes clear why Boylan’s concerns matter. When cyber tools are used to target systems that civilians depend on, the line between military and civilian harm becomes blurred. A virtuous decision-maker would approach such operations with significant caution and a willingness to limit their scope.

From this perspective, cyberwarfare is not automatically unjust. However, it demands a very high level of moral responsibility from those who deploy it. Without that level of prudence and restraint, cyber operations risk becoming ethically problematic even if they are intended to serve a legitimate military purpose.

Mariarosaria Taddeo’s analysis of cyberwarfare focuses heavily on responsibility and the unique ethical challenges created by digital conflict. Like Boylan, she argues that cyberwar must still follow the basic principles of just war theory. However, she also emphasizes that cyber operations introduce new complications because of how interconnected digital systems are.

One of Taddeo’s most important points is that cyberattacks often produce indirect or cascading effects. When one system is targeted, the damage may spread through networks and impact other systems that were never intended to be part of the attack. For example, disrupting a communication network could affect emergency services, transportation systems, or hospitals that rely on that infrastructure to function. Because digital systems are deeply interconnected, it can be difficult to predict exactly how far those effects might travel.

This raises serious questions about moral responsibility. Taddeo argues that states cannot avoid responsibility for the consequences of their cyber operations simply because the technology involved is complex. If the potential risks are foreseeable, then the actors who launch those cyberattacks still bear responsibility for the harm that follows.

Virtue ethics aligns closely with this idea because it emphasizes accountability and moral integrity. A virtuous decision-maker does not hide behind technical complexity or uncertainty to avoid responsibility. Instead, they take those risks seriously and make decisions carefully, understanding that their actions may affect large numbers of people.

Another virtue that becomes especially important in cyberwarfare is temperance, which refers to restraint and self-control. Cyber tools can be extremely powerful and relatively inexpensive compared to traditional military force. This creates a temptation to rely on cyberattacks more aggressively because they appear to involve less immediate physical destruction. However, virtue ethics reminds us that having the ability to do something does not necessarily make it morally acceptable to do it.

Temperance requires decision-makers to exercise restraint, especially when dealing with technologies capable of widespread disruption. If cyberattacks against infrastructure become normalized, it could lead to a broader escalation of cyber conflict between states. This kind of escalation could make global systems more unstable and increase the risk of widespread disruption to civilian life.

Taddeo also stresses the importance of maintaining ethical norms in cyberwarfare. Norms help prevent conflict from becoming unlimited or indiscriminate. When states demonstrate restraint and responsibility in how they use cyber capabilities, they reinforce those norms and help establish ethical boundaries for future conflicts.

From the perspective of virtue ethics, this idea connects to the concept of moral example. When powerful actors behave responsibly, they encourage similar behavior from others. But when they exploit vulnerabilities without restraint, they risk weakening the moral standards that help limit the harm caused by warfare.

Applying this framework to the case described in the article raises important concerns. Cyber operations targeting infrastructure may achieve strategic goals, but they also carry the risk of harming civilians indirectly. If decision-makers fail to fully account for those risks, their actions may reflect a lack of prudence and temperance.

Taddeo’s analysis ultimately reinforces the idea that cyberwarfare is not inherently unethical. However, it becomes morally questionable when the actors involved fail to demonstrate the responsibility and restraint required to prevent unnecessary harm.

Cyberwarfare presents serious ethical challenges because it operates within digital systems that are deeply connected to everyday civilian life. As both Boylan and Taddeo show, the traditional principles of just war theory become more difficult to apply when cyber operations can spread beyond their intended targets or disrupt infrastructure used by both military and civilian populations.

Using virtue ethics as a framework helps highlight an important aspect of this problem. Ethical warfare is not only about following rules or achieving strategic goals. It also depends on the character and judgment of the individuals making decisions. Virtues such as prudence, justice, and temperance are especially important when dealing with powerful technologies capable of causing widespread disruption.

This analysis suggests that cyber operations could potentially be part of a just war if they are conducted with careful restraint and a serious commitment to minimizing harm. However, the cyber actions described in the case raise ethical concerns because they risk causing broader consequences than intended.

As cyber capabilities continue to expand, maintaining strong moral discipline will become increasingly important in preventing digital conflict from escalating beyond ethical limits.