Case Analysis: Cyberwarfare Actions in Hybrid Kinetic Warfare
The article “Digital Battlegrounds: Evolving Hybrid Kinetic Warfare” by Veeneman (2023) explores cyberwarfare actions during the Israel-Hamas conflict in October 2023, highlighting their role in hybrid warfare, which combines kinetic and non-kinetic tactics to destabilize adversaries. On October 6th, the pro-Iranian hacktivist group Cyber Av3ngers launched a DDoS attack on Israel’s electricity industry Independent System Operator (Noga), disrupting critical infrastructure (Veeneman, 2023). The following day, Anonymous Sudan and AnonGhost targeted the Red Alert system, spamming false missile alerts via vulnerable APIs, causing widespread panic and hindering emergency responses (Veeneman, 2023). Further attacks compromised the Israel Electric Corporation, components of the Iron Dome system, and the Government of Israel website while also targeting financial institutions like Discount Bank Israel (Veeneman, 2023). These actions aimed to sow chaos, disrupt civilian life, and undermine national security by targeting essential services like power grids, alert systems, and telecommunications, which are vital for societal stability. Although these cyberattacks were bloodless, their impact on civilian infrastructure raises ethical concerns about their role in warfare. In this Case Analysis, I will argue that utilitarianism shows us that these actions could not be part of a just war because they disproportionately harm civilians and destabilize societal well-being, outweighing any strategic gains.
Analysis Using Taddeo’s Concepts
Taddeo’s framework in “An Analysis for a Just Cyber-Warfare” provides a robust ethical lens for evaluating cyberwarfare by merging Just War Theory with Information Ethics. She defines cyberwarfare as “the warfare grounded on certain uses of ICTs within an offensive or defensive military strategy endorsed by a state and aiming at the immediate disruption or control of the enemy’s resources, and which is waged within the informational environment, with agents and targets ranging both on the physical and non-physical domains and whose level of violence may vary upon circumstances” (Taddeo, 2012). This definition underscores two critical aspects of cyberwarfare: its informational nature, driven by the use of ICTs to “elaborate, manage and communicate data and information,” and its transversality, which allows it to “escalate from non-violent to more violent forms” across domains (Taddeo, 2012). Taddeo argues that Information Ethics imposes an obligation to “respect the integrity of informational entities,” including societal systems like communication networks, to prevent unjust harm (Taddeo, 2012). She also highlights a key ethical challenge: cyberwarfare disrupts the Just War principle of “war as last resort,” which traditionally assumes war’s violent nature. Taddeo notes, “The application of this principle is shaken when CW is taken into consideration because, in this case, war may be bloodless and not involve physical violence at all” (Taddeo, 2012). This raises the possibility that bloodless cyberattacks might justify earlier intervention to avert traditional conflict, but such actions must still adhere to the ethical duty to protect non-combatants.
In the Israel-Hamas conflict, the cyberattacks described by Veeneman (2023) exemplify Taddeo’s concept of transversality. The attacks range from non-violent DDoS disruptions to potentially escalatory actions with broader implications. On October 6th, the pro-Iranian hacktivist group Cyber Av3ngers launched a DDoS attack on Israel’s electricity industry Independent System Operator (Noga), and the following day, Anonymous Sudan and AnonGhost targeted the Red Alert system, “spamming false Red Alert system missile alerts via exposed vulnerable APIs” (Veeneman, 2023). These actions targeted critical informational infrastructure, which Taddeo would classify as informational entities deserving ethical protection under Information Ethics. The Red Alert system, for instance, is a societal lifeline designed to “automatically activate the public broadcast warning system” and send alerts to mobile devices during rocket launches (Veeneman, 2023). Disrupting it directly impaired civilian safety; as Veeneman (2023) notes, “The loss of alerting and communication systems at the early stages of the conflict had catastrophic consequences… achieving the immediate goal of exacerbating panic and confusion among the populace.” This focus on civilian systems violates the Just War principle of non-combatant immunity, as the attacks caused harm to civilians rather than military targets, conflicting with Taddeo’s ethical framework.
Taddeo’s argument about the potential of bloodless cyberattacks to avert greater violence is particularly relevant here. She posits that a cyberattack could resolve tensions and “avert the possibility of a traditional war in the foreseeable future,” as it might affect only “the informational grid of the other state, and there would be no casualties” (Taddeo, 2012). In the Israel-Hamas case, one might argue that disrupting Noga or the Red Alert system could pressure military operations to de-escalate by creating operational challenges. However, this rationale fails because the attacks primarily targeted civilian infrastructure, not military assets. The harm did not avert greater violence but exacerbated civilian suffering (Veeneman, 2023). For example, the false missile alerts led to widespread panic, undermining civilians’ ability to respond effectively to real threats, while the attack on Noga disrupted electricity, a fundamental societal need. This misalignment with Information Ethics highlights the ethical failure of these actions, as they damaged societal systems rather than achieving a military objective that could justify such intervention.
Additionally, Taddeo warns of cyberwarfare’s transversality across domains, noting that it “may involve a computer virus able to disrupt or deny access to the enemy’s database… without exerting physical force or violence” but can also escalate to cause physical harm, such as “a cyber attack targeting a military aerial control system causing aircraft to crash” (Taddeo, 2012). In this case, while the attacks were initially bloodless, their potential to escalate is evident in the broader context. Veeneman (2023) points out that “lingering malware implanted in critical systems during the conflict… could be activated at any time,” posing risks like power outages or further disruptions to civilian life. The attack on the Israel Electric Corporation, which impacted “components or function of the Iron Dome system,” illustrates this escalation potential, as it could indirectly lead to physical harm by weakening defense systems (Veeneman, 2023). This transversality underscores the ethical complexity of cyberwarfare, as the initial non-violent nature of the attacks does not negate their broader harmful impact on civilians, further violating Taddeo’s ethical standards.
Utilitarianism, as an ethical tool, deems these actions unjust within a just war framework. Utilitarianism judges actions based on their results, focusing on increasing happiness and decreasing suffering. Cyberattacks generally have bad results for ordinary people. These attacks often cause widespread fear and disruption. They can interrupt vital services that people depend on daily, leading to chaos and instability. The impact is not just immediate; it also creates lasting security issues that can make everyone feel more vulnerable in the future. Veeneman (2023) notes that the attacks led to “delayed decision-making” and “constrained recovery efforts,” decreasing societal happiness and increasing suffering. The temporary strategic disruption achieved by the hacktivist groups does not outweigh the societal harm, as civilian infrastructure bore the brunt of the attacks. A utilitarian approach would advocate for avoiding civilian targets, focusing instead on military-specific cyber operations. For example, targeting encrypted military communications or logistics systems could achieve strategic goals without endangering civilian lives.
Analysis Using Boylan’s Concepts
Michael Boylan’s ethical framework in “Can There Be a Just War?” centers on protecting fundamental human goods, which he terms the “Goods of Agency.” These include life, basic needs (such as food, shelter, and safety), and the capacity to act as a moral agent, all essential for human flourishing (Boylan, 2013). Boylan aligns his framework with the Just War Theory, emphasizing principles like non-combatant immunity and proportionality. He argues that actions in warfare must prioritize minimizing harm to civilians and ensure that the intended good outweighs the harm caused. Additionally, Boylan stresses the importance of intention, asserting that morally permissible actions should aim to achieve a greater good without unnecessarily targeting innocent parties (Boylan, 2013). This perspective demands that warfare actions respect the fundamental rights of individuals, especially those not directly involved in the conflict, to maintain ethical integrity.
In the context of the Israel-Hamas conflict, the cyberattacks described by Veeneman (2023) directly undermine Boylan’s Goods of Agency for civilians. The DDoS attack on Noga disrupted electricity, a basic need critical for societal functioning. At the same time, the spamming of false Red Alert missile alerts caused widespread panic, compromising civilian safety and the ability to respond to emergencies (Veeneman, 2023). These actions targeted civilian infrastructure rather than military assets, violating the principle of non-combatant immunity. For example, the disruption of the Red Alert system meant that “the loss of alerting and communication systems… impacted the ability of both civilian and military personnel to respond effectively,” exacerbating chaos (Veeneman, 2023). This directly impaired civilians’ capacity to act as moral agents in a stable environment, as they were left vulnerable to misinformation and delayed emergency responses. The intention behind these attacks further conflicts with Boylan’s requirement for morally permissible actions, as the primary harm was directed at civilian well-being rather than military objectives.
Using utilitarianism as the ethical tool, these cyberattacks are unjustifiable within a just war framework. Utilitarianism evaluates actions based on their consequences, seeking to maximize overall happiness and minimize suffering. The consequences of these cyberattacks were overwhelmingly negative for civilians: widespread fear disrupted essential services like electricity and long-term vulnerabilities such as “lingering malware implanted in critical systems” that could cause further damage post-conflict (Veeneman, 2023). While the hacktivist groups may have gained a temporary strategic advantage by sowing chaos, this does not outweigh the societal harm inflicted, as the attacks primarily targeted civilian infrastructure rather than military capabilities. A utilitarian approach would demand that the actors refrain from targeting civilian systems, instead focusing on military-specific targets to minimize collateral damage. For instance, attacking military communication networks rather than public alert systems could achieve strategic goals without endangering civilian lives. By prioritizing civilian safety, the actors could align with utilitarian principles, ensuring that the overall consequences promote societal well-being rather than suffering, thus adhering to the ethical standards of a just war.
Conclusion
This analysis, utilizing Boylan’s Goods of Agency and Taddeo’s Information Ethics alongside utilitarianism, argues that the cyberwarfare actions in the Israel-Hamas conflict—specifically the DDoS attacks on Noga, the Red Alert system, and other civilian infrastructure—cannot be part of a just war. These actions disproportionately harmed civilians by disrupting essential services, violating non-combatant immunity, and causing more societal suffering than strategic gain, as evidenced by their exacerbation of panic and hindrance of emergency responses (Veeneman, 2023). An alternate perspective might argue that such cyberattacks are justifiable to prevent escalation; as Taddeo (2012) notes, bloodless actions could avert traditional violence. However, this view falters here, as the attacks targeted civilians, not military assets, increasing harm rather than reducing it. Given hybrid warfare’s evolving threats, a broader implication is the urgent need for international norms to protect civilian infrastructure in cyber warfare. A limitation of this position is the challenge of distinguishing military from civilian targets in interconnected digital systems, which may complicate utilitarian assessments in future conflicts.


References
Boylan, M. (2013). Can there be a just war? Marymount University.
Taddeo, M. (2012). An analysis for a just cyber-warfare [Conference paper]. ResearchGate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/261488493
Veeneman, P. (2023). Digital battlegrounds: Evolving hybrid kinetic warfare. Industrial Cyber. https://industrialcyber.co/analysis/digital-battlegrounds-evolving-hybrid-kinetic-warfare/